Against all noise by Volstorf, Jenny
Against all noise 
On noise-robust strategies in the emergence of cooperation
D i s s e r t a t i o n 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. rer. nat. 
im Fach Psychologie 
eingereicht an der
Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät II
der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
von
Dipl.-Psych. Jenny Volstorf
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz
Dekan der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät II
Prof. Dr. Elmar Kulke
Gutachter
1. Prof. Dr. Gerd Gigerenzer
2. Prof. Dr. Jörg Rieskamp





For  cooperation  to  evolve  via  direct  reciprocity,  individuals  must  track  their  partners’ 
behaviour  to  avoid  exploitation.  Noise  (i.e.,  memory  errors  or  perception/decision  errors) 
compromises tracking, however. In my thesis, I investigate whether strategies proposed to model 
human behaviour are cognitively feasible and how they cope with noise, and explore feasible 
noise-robust alternatives. 
Tit-For-Tat,  the most prominent example of 1-step memory strategies, is  not robust to 
noise, because even little noise decreases its success. Since noise is quite common in everyday 
life, Tit-For-Tat is not an ideal candidate to model human behaviour. Chapter 1 showed that 
participants, when asked to remember their partners’ previous behaviour (1-step memory), had 
high  memory error  rates.  In  an  evolutionary simulation,  these  rates  let  cooperation  vanish. 
Remembering a partners’ previous behaviour is neither noise-robust nor cognitively feasible. 
In Chapter 2, I investigated whether people use the cognitively more feasible strategy of 
categorizing  partners  into  types,  distinguishing  cooperators  and  cheaters.  Compared  to 
remembering each partners’ previous behaviour, this would reduce memory effort. The results 
indicate that people differentiate partner types and adjust their strategy to the proportion of types 
in their environment.
Chapter 3 explored strategies that model the process of categorizing partners into types by 
building an impression. In a simulation, impression-based strategies were more robust to noise 
in maintaining cooperation than 1-step memory strategies. A cross-validation of strategies on 
data  from Chapter  2  confirmed  that  impression-based  strategies  better  predict  participants’ 
behaviour than 1-step memory strategies. The winner of the simulation and the cross-validation 
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Imagine you collaborated with a colleague on a project. It was your last project working 
for the company before you will head off to a new job, and you put hard work into it. You have  
never collaborated with this colleague before, and he will leave the company, too. The boss is 
not satisfied with the quality and wants to talk to you both individually to search for reasons and 
find  the  one  to  blame.  Imagine  further  that  the  two  of  you  just  have  the  choice  between 
“cooperating” and “defecting” with the other, when “cooperating” means to remain silent and 
“defecting” is to blame the other one. You have no opportunity of talking to each other, and even 
if the other was at the boss’ first, you do not have a chance getting to know what he decided to 
do  before  you  go  talking  to  the  boss  yourself.  Depending  on  what  your  colleague  (called 
“partner”) and you (called “player”) decide to do, you receive payoff mirroring the benefits. 
There are four possible combinations: First, you defect with your colleague and blame 
him, whereas he cooperates and remains silent. Thereby, you are looking pretty good in the eyes 
of  your  boss  (usually  represented  by  a  payoff  of  5);  your  colleague  attracts  the  whole 
resentment. Second, your colleague and you defect with each other and blame one another. The 
boss will think that none of you is completely innocent when it comes to the quality of the work  
and call both of you to account (payoff: 1). Third, your colleague and you cooperate and remain 
silent what concerns the one to blame. Your boss will be insecure and teach both of you at least a 
little lesson (payoff: 3). Fourth, you protect your colleague and remain silent, whereas he blames 
you. You will have to carry the whole damage yourself (payoff: 0), whereas your colleague gets  
away without a penalty. You will want to save yourself and defect, hoping that the other one will 
not (payoff: 5; called “T” for temptation), but if your colleague comes to the same conclusion, 
you will end up sharing the boss’ conviction (payoff: 1; called “P” for punishment). So you 
might think of cooperating, hoping that the other one will, too (payoff: 3; called “R” for reward), 
but you risk getting all the blame (payoff: 0; called “S” for sucker). What would you do?
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Considering that you have no strings attached to the colleague or the company, you might 
defect. Now imagine this situation in your new company with a colleague you will probably 
collaborate with repeatedly. There is hardly a doubt that you will cooperate. The prospect of 
repeated interactions does not only impose discipline with regards to the temptation but also 
offers the possibility to punish the partner if he exploited you. Still, each cooperation bares the 
risk of sucking which makes the situation a fascinating research subject. Since the early 1950s, 
researchers have used this paradigm (called Prisoner’s Dilemma after the original example; e.g., 
Luce  &  Raiffa,  1957)  to  investigate  the  emergence  of  cooperation.  It  only  qualifies  as  a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game if the payoffs meet the size order: T > R > P > S and if alternating  
defection and cooperation is, on average, not more beneficial than mutual cooperation: 2R > (T 
+ S).
In his seminal work, Axelrod (1984) asked which strategies people could use to gain the 
best  possible  payoff  playing  repeated  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  games  (called  Iterated  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma) against a variety of partners and when continuation of the interaction is uncertain. In 
several of his studies (1980a,  1980b,  1987), Tit-For-Tat (TFT) won, a strategy that begins by 
cooperating and then reciprocates the partner’s previous move. Although celebrated because of 
its intuitive eye-for-an-eye style, there is hardly evidence for TFT outside of theoretical studies 
(e.g.,  Oskamp, 1971, Wilson, 1971, König, 1988, Opp, 1988, Masters & Waite, 1990). How is 
that?  Noise had been neglected in its design. There are different sources of noise. Noise can 
come along with the requirements of the strategy (e.g.,  memory, amount of computation) or 
result  from  the  decision  maker  (e.g.,  perception,  decision).  Whether  a  decision  maker 
implements a decision in compliance with a strategy depends on both sources. One can ask for 
each strategy whether its  requirements are  cognitively feasible  and how it  copes with noise 
originating from the decision maker. 
Authors soon established that TFT is not robust to noise from the decision maker—one 
incorrectly implemented move diminishes its success (e.g.,  Molander, 1985). As noise-robust 
alternatives,  authors  proposed,  among  others,  a  generous  version  of  TFT  (begin  with 
cooperation, reciprocate the partner’s move, but after defection cooperate with some probability; 
e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 1992) and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (begin with cooperation and cooperate 
after mutual cooperation or mutual defection, otherwise defect; e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). 
Being both members of the 1-step memory family just like TFT, they, too, require to remember a 
partner’s  previous  move.  Whereas  generous  TFT and  Win-Stay,  Lose-Shift  proposed  more 
robustness to noise from the decision maker,  they did not take into account noise from the 
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design of the strategy. Is the requirement to remember each partner’s previous move cognitively 
feasible? If not, one would have to explore a different strategical design to find strategies that 
master both sources of noise. These considerations determine the content of my thesis. 
Chapter  1  investigates  whether  remembering  each  partner’s  previous  move,  as  1-step 
memory strategies require, is cognitively feasible and whether these strategies are in fact noise-
robust  as  was  proposed.  Chapters  2  and  3  explore  cognitively  feasible  and  noise-robust 
strategies  to  explain  the  emergence  of  cooperation.  These  strategies  take  into  account  yet 
another  source  of  noise:  the  interaction  partner.  To  distinguish  between  intentional  and 
unintentional partner behaviour, the strategies do not just consider the partner’s previous move 
but his typical behaviour.
Are Tit-For-Tat and its relatives cognitively feasible and noise-robust?
When Axelrod (1984) wanted to find the best strategy for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
the proposed strategies were designed to gain the highest payoff against a variety of partners. To 
achieve this, some of the strategies used complex calculations to predict the partner’s next move 
or a specifically worked-out agenda for what to do at which point in the encounter. This is an 
example strategy (Axelrod, 1980a): 
GRAASKAMP […] plays tit for tat for 50 moves, defects once, plays tit for tat for 
another 5 moves, and then examines the history of the game so far. Its defection on 
move 51 allows it to recognize its own twin and be cooperative with it. Similarly, it  
can check to see if the other player seems to be TIT FOR TAT or another program it 
recognizes. If so, it plays the rest of the game in an appropriate way. If its score is not 
very good, it suspects (perhaps incorrectly) that it is playing RANDOM and defects 
for the rest of the game. Otherwise it continues to play tit for tat, but throws in a 
defection every five to fifteen moves. (p. 12)
These strategies did not conform to the concept of a boundedly rational decision maker 
who  finds  a  good  decision  with  limited  time,  limited  knowledge,  and  limited  cognitive 
capacities (Simon, 1956,  Selten, 2001). To the general surprise, with TFT, a strategy won that 
adheres to a comparatively simple rule: Begin with cooperation and reciprocate your partner’s 
previous move. TFT did not always gain the highest payoff but,  on average,  a good payoff 
against  a  variety  of  partners.  Moreover,  compared  to  other  strategies  (see  GRAASKAMP 
above),  it  uses  limited  information  (the  partner’s  previous  move)  and  does  not  have  high 
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cognitive requirements. TFT is a simple strategy. Or is it? 
TFT is the most prominent example of 1-step memory strategies, and for it to work, TFT 
has  to  remember the partner’s previous move exactly,  interpret it  exactly,  and reciprocate it 
exactly. Two opponents repeatedly playing TFT gain the highest average payoff and establish 
mutual cooperation, but a single deviation, a single incorrectly implemented move, destroys this 
success,  because  both  opponents  will  in  turn  reciprocate  the  defective  move.  As  a  result, 
alternately  gaining  Temptation’s  and  Sucker’s  payoff  gives  less  than  the  averaged  Reward 
(Axelrod, 1984). TFT is not robust to perception or decision errors.
Axelrod  (1980a) had already remarked TFT’s susceptibility to punishment by being too 
easily provoked and even uttered “[...] a warning against the facile belief than [sic!] an eye for 
an eye is necessarily the best strategy”. The degree of forgiveness to avoid this negative effect, 
Axelrod  wrote,  would  depend  on the  environment  (i.e.,  the  competing  strategies).  Whereas 
TFT’s  degree  of  forgiveness  (i.e.,  robustness  to  noise—or  lack  thereof)  was  adaptive  in 
Axelrod’s  (1984) tournament  environments,  it  could  fail  in  a  different  environment.  In 
interactions between humans, for example, more noise is to be expected, asking for noise-robust 
strategies to maintain cooperation.
Whereas Axelrod  (1984) had referred to TFT’s susceptibility to noise from the decision 
maker (perception/decision errors), he had not studied the feasibility of TFT’s requirements. 
Memory is one of the cognitive capacities needed for reciprocity (which TFT tries to model; 
Stevens,  Cushman  &  Hauser,  2005).  Are  humans  capable  of  remembering  each  partner’s 
previous move? In human interactions, noise in the form of memory errors could arise when 
players do not meet their partners one (repeatedly) after the other, as assumed in theoretical 
work (e.g.,  Axelrod, 1984). Under more realistic conditions, when players meet their partners 
randomly (as in Winkler, Jonas & Rudolph, 2008), remembering each partners’ previous move 
would  become  an  enormous  task.  The  probability  of  committing  but  a  single  error  would 
increase  and  demonstrate  TFT’s  susceptibility  to  noise.  The  first  hypothesis  of  Chapter  1, 
therefore, is that TFT and its 1-step memory relatives are not simple strategies with prerequisites 
meeting the capacities of a boundedly rational decision maker.
Participants met several partners repeatedly but randomly and observed their behaviour. 
Then, participants were asked to recall their partners’ previous move—just like 1-step memory 
strategies require. This procedure would reveal whether participants were theoretically capable 
of using TFT and its relatives. Also, it would give an idea of realistic noise levels. Previous 
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simulations had tested the robustness to noise of TFT and other 1-step memory strategies. In 
these simulations, noise was not defined as memory error. Nevertheless, I draw on them for 
comparison, because this distinction in content is irrelevant for a player in the simulation: He 
commits an error—regardless of the source. Noise in these previous studies ranged—except for 
a few analytical derivations (Molander, 1985, Boyd, 1989, Bendor, 1993)—from  p = 0.001–0.2 
to do the opposite move (Donninger, 1986, Müller, 1987, Lindgren. 1991, Nowak & Sigmund, 
1993, Wu & Axelrod, 1995, Lomborg, 1996, Miller, 1996, Sherratt & Roberts, 1999, Wakano & 
Yamamura, 2001, Hruschka & Henrich, 2006, Anh, Pereira & Santos, 2011). Are these levels of 
noise to be expected in human interactions? In the second part of Chapter 1, simulations should 
show how noise-robust TFT and other 1-step memory strategies would be at the experimentally 
derived noise levels and whether they were able to maintain cooperation. Find the results in 
Chapter 1.
Is the strategy of assigning partner types ecologically rational?
Despite TFT’s susceptibility to noise and although its 1-step memory design probably does 
not  model  human behaviour,  the appealing is  the  idea of  reciprocity behind it.  Not  getting 
exploited but also reciprocating cooperation allows for the best average payoff against a variety 
of partners. Moreover, reciprocity can establish cooperation as the condition both players, on the 
long run, benefit most from (Trivers, 1971, but see Rothstein & Pierotti, 1988, on the debate of 
the correct term). With reciprocity as modelled by TFT, however, noise would cause the player  
to remember incorrectly at times, perceive incorrectly, or reciprocate incorrectly. This resulted in 
unprotected exploitation by defecting partners or needless defections with cooperating partners. 
How could someone forego this? As outlined in the previous section, this does not call for a 
strategy considering more information, employing more computation, and consequently using 
more time to take into account all possible partner’s moves (Hertwig & Todd, 2003). Instead, I 
am looking for a strategy applicable by a boundedly rational decision maker.
When asking participants of Chapter 1’s experiment about their strategy to remember their 
partners’ moves,  some  participants  reported  that  they  ignored  part  of  the  information  and 
concentrated on one partner behaviour, inferring the other probably by means of elimination. 
One participant wrote: “I only memorized names of cooperators. If a name came up that did not  
belong to the cooperators, I concluded that he did not cooperate”. Because the computer partners 
in Chapter 1’s experiment behaved randomly, participants concentrating on one behaviour had to 
constantly update the list of partners to memorize. In contrast, in everyday interactions, partners 
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probably adhere to strategies that result in a pattern or general tendency of behaviour and may 
be categorized into types (e.g., cooperators, defectors). Concentrating on one type in such an 
environment  involved a lot  less updating.  In general,  assigning types  to interaction partners 
avoids  having  to  remember  every  previous  move,  thereby  reducing  memory  requirements. 
Judging by the type, a player would not be fooled by defectors’ occasional cooperative moves 
and excuse cooperators’ occasional defections, thereby offering robustness to noise from the 
partner. Preferentially remembering one type could reduce memory requirements even more, 
resulting in yet more robustness in regards to that source of noise.
Which  type  did  participants  concentrate  on?  Is  it  more  advantageous  to  memorize 
defectors for protecting against exploitation, or lies more benefit in securing mutual cooperation 
by  sticking  to  cooperators?  About  equally  many  participants  from Chapter  1’s  experiment 
reported  they  focused  on  cooperators  as  reported  they  focused  on  defectors.  Based  on  the 
benefits and costs imposed by the payoff matrix, some participants apparently concluded that 
they should keep an eye on defectors. Or was an adaptive cheater-detection mechanism at work 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989)? Which type to remember could also depend on the environment (in 
this  case,  the  proportion  of  defectors  and  cooperators),  as  remembering  defectors  in  an 
environment with a majority of defectors does not reduce memory requirements much. Finding 
not only boundedly but also ecologically rational strategies (i.e.,  adapted to an environment; 
Simon, 1956, Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012) is the subject of investigation in Chapter 2.
Are  impression-based  strategies  cognitively  feasible  and  noise-robust 
alternatives to 1-step memory strategies?
When  Axelrod  (1984) described  that  even  two  TFT  opponents  may  be  caught  in 
alternating  defections,  I  have  so  far  assumed  that  this  effect  was  caused  by perception  or 
decision errors in the player. There is a third source of noise, however: the interaction partner. 
He is prone to the same noise sources as the player and could implement an incorrect move 
unintentionally. To prepare against this form of noise, it would be advantageous to have more 
information  about  the partner’s  behaviour.  This  would  allow to  distinguish intentional  from 
unintentional moves.
Identifying TFT as a “successful strategy in a highly constrained and uniform universe”, 
Cosmides and Tooby (1989) suggested a list of information a strategy should consider before 
making a decision: 
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1) the number of transactions one has had with that individual in the past, 2) how he 
or  she  behaved  in  those  transactions  (reputation),  3)  the  size  of  payoffs  to  both 
parties in previous transactions, 4) whether his or her tendency to cheat varied with 
the  size  of  the  payoff  involved,  5)  whether  the  conditions  governing  his  or  her 
tendency to cheat have been shifting over time, 6) his or her aggressive formidability, 
7) how likely one is to meet that individual in the future (e.g., one party is moving 
away or likely to die soon), and 8) whether one has accepted a past benefit but has 
not reciprocated yet. (p. 62)
They  continue  by  saying  that  “Information  about  one’s  history  of  interaction  with  a 
particular  person ought  to  be  ‘filed’ with  that  person’s  ‘identity’ and  activated  quickly and 
effortlessly when an exchange-relevant situation with that person arises”. The previous section 
mentioned a strategy combining many of the suggested information and showing a way how to 
quickly access them. By assigning partner types, a player could be as successful as TFT against 
a variety of partners. Instead of reciprocating single moves, the player would reciprocate typical 
behaviour. Because assigning types reduces memory requirements and decreases the probability 
of reciprocating atypical behaviour, such a strategy would be more robust to noise than 1-step 
memory strategies.  This is  the first  hypothesis  tested in Chapter 3.  Whereas this hypothesis 
establishes the idea of partner types and their advantage in contrast to 1-step memory strategies,  
I  have  not  yet  examined  how  types  come  about.  Chapter  3  investigates  the  process  of 
categorizing partners into types by building an impression.
Other authors have dealt with partner types and how to assess them. In studies of indirect 
reciprocity, a player decides how to behave with a partner based on the reputation, an image 
score,  of  the  latter  (e.g.,  Nowak  &  Sigmund,  1998).  This  score  is  accumulated  through 
interactions with third parties, though. How generalizable is that information when it comes to 
the player’s own encounter with the partner and how reliable is it considering noise from the  
source of that information (Boerlijst, Nowak & Sigmund, 1997)? In contrast, finding out about a 
partner’s type during interactions with him would reflect personal experience with the partner 
and  eliminate  the  additional  source  of  noise  from the  third  party.  This  idea  of  impression 
building  underlay the  design  of  Chapter  2’s  experiment,  and  it  will  underlie  the  design  of 
impression-based strategies in Chapter 3.
In Aktipis’ (2006) partner type model, a player categorizes his partner on the basis of one 
interaction. Whereas this experience is certainly personal, it does not differ from the concept of 
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1-step memory strategies. If the player perceives this one move incorrectly, he will treat the 
partner  inappropriately  in  the  coming  encounters.  As  in  Chapter  2’s  experiment,  my 
collaborators and I envisioned impression building as a continuing process based on repeated 
interactions.  Realizing  a  partner’s  typical  behaviour  would  allow  to  ignore  part  of  the 
information, namely atypical behaviour, and be more robust to noise from the partner.
Handling more information than the previous move and combining it into an impression 
can  mean  to  deviate  from the  idea  of  keeping  one  information  per  partner  in  mind.  Still,  
considering  more  information  does  not  have  to  interfere  with  the  concept  of  a  boundedly 
rational decision maker. It is not the mere quantity of information but its quality that counts. 
When asking participants  of  Chapter  1’s  experiment  about  their  strategy to  remember  their 
partner’s moves, the majority revealed that they did not construct an abstract memory account—
probably because they reached the limits of memory capacity at one point. Instead, they used 
mnemonics and tried to link facial features to the behaviour, assigned memories of friends with 
the same names, or even characterizing stories. This technique enables participants in memory 
competitions to memorize hundreds of numbers (e.g., Levin, Levin, Glasman & Nordwall, 1992, 
on  the  effectiveness  of  mnemonics).  Just  like  participants  in  Chapter  1’s  experiment  added 
information (mnemonics) to assign more meaning to abstract items in order to reduce memory 
requirements, humans could add information (and combine into a partner’s impression) to assign 
more meaning to their partners’ behaviour.
I could imagine different possibilities how humans arrive at an impression, resulting in 
different impression-based strategies. What differentiates these strategies and whether they are 
more robust to noise than 1-step memory strategies is the subject of the first part of Chapter 3. 
The  second  part  will  complement  the  theoretical  considerations  by  investigating  whether 
impression-based strategies can predict participants’ behaviour.
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Chapter 1




Chapter 1 is based on the paper with the same title that developed in collaboration with 
Jeffrey  R.  Stevens,  Lael  J.  Schooler,  and  Jörg  Rieskamp  (Stevens,  Volstorf,  Schooler  & 
Rieskamp, 2011). To comply with the rest of the thesis, I changed American into British English 
and adapted the usage of terms (e.g., “memory-1” or “memory-2 strategies” became “1-step” or 
“2-step memory strategies”). Also, I adapted the numbering of tables and figures to be chapter 
specific. Available with the original paper are the participants’ data, the R code to analyse them, 
and the Pascal code to run the simulations. Since these materials would go beyond the scope of  
this  book,  I  omit  them  here  and  refer  the  interested  reader  to  the  source  at 
http://www.frontiersin.org/Cognitive_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00235/full.
This work would not have been possible without the support of many colleagues.  We 
thank Gregor Caregnato for testing the participants, Natalie Ebner for allowing us to use her 
face photos, Sebastian Scholz for translating our NetLogo code into Pascal, and Mario Fific, 
Henrik Olsson, and Max Wolf for comments on an early version of the manuscript. Funding for 
the project was provided by the Max Planck Society. This project was approved by the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Development Ethics Commission.
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Abstract
Theoretical  studies  of  cooperative  behaviour  have  focused  on  decision  strategies  that 
depend on a partner’s last choices. The findings from this work assume that players accurately 
remember past actions. The kind of memory that these strategies employ, however, does not 
reflect what we know about memory. Here, we show that human memory may not meet the 
requirements needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous behaviour of 
simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed poorly, making errors 
in 10–24% of the trials. Participants made more errors when required to track more partners. We 
conducted agent-based simulations to evaluate how well cooperative strategies cope with error. 
These simulations suggest that, even with few errors, cooperation could not be maintained at the 
error rates demonstrated by our participants. Our results indicate that the strategies typically 
used in the study of cooperation likely do not reflect the underlying cognitive capacities used by 
humans and other animals in social  interactions. By including unrealistic assumptions about 
cognition, theoretical models may have overestimated the robustness of the existing cooperative 
strategies. To remedy this, future models should incorporate what we know about cognition.
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Introduction
Theoretical analyses have demonstrated that cooperation can evolve in situations in which 
individuals interact repeatedly and their  behaviour depends on other’s and/or their  own past 
behaviour (Axelrod & Hamilton,  1981,  Nowak, 2006).  For instance,  the celebrated decision 
strategy Tit-For-Tat  (TFT) cooperates  on the first  move with  a  partner  and then  copies  the 
partner’s single last  choice (cooperate or defect) on all subsequent interactions (Rapoport & 
Chammah, 1965, Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). This and similar strategies, such as generous TFT 
(gTFT),  contrite  TFT (cTFT),  Tit-For-Two-Tats  (TF2T),  and  Win-Stay,  Lose-Shift  (WSLS; 
Boyd, 1989, Kraines & Kraines, 1989, Nowak & Sigmund, 1992), have dominated theoretical 
studies of cooperation for the last 30 years. Despite their dominance in the theoretical work, the 
assumptions  about  the underlying cognition required to  implement  these strategies have not 
been adequately tested. 
Thus, there is a critical gap between the theoretical work on which decision strategies can 
maintain cooperation and the empirical work on what strategies individuals actually use. To 
bridge this gap, we must test whether the cognitive capacities required to implement strategies 
are psychologically plausible (Stephens, McLinn & Stevens, 2002, Hammerstein, 2003, Stevens 
& Hauser, 2004,  Stevens et al., 2005,  Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). Here, we investigate one of 
these cognitive capacities: memory for past actions. We ask whether existing strategies make 
reasonable assumptions about memory or whether problems associated with forgetting could 
constrain the emergence of these cooperative strategies.
Memory  represents  a  primary  cognitive  capacity  needed  for  strategies  in  social 
interactions  that  depend on past  behaviour.  The strategies  tested  in  the  literature  for  social 
interaction make different memory requests. The so-called 1-step memory strategies require that 
players  accurately  remember  the  single  last  choice  from  each  partner.  Two-step  memory 
strategies  require  accurate  memory  for  the  last  two  choices.  Humans  and  other  animals, 
however, sometimes forget. If an individual cannot remember the past action of an interaction 
partner, then he or she cannot apply a strategy that relies on this knowledge. 
In contrast to the existing cooperative strategies, our memory does not work like computer 
memory,  filing away pieces of  information for flawless retrieval  later.  Instead,  our  memory 
functions more like how a search engine retrieves information from the internet, with memory 
records associated to retrieval cues (Estes, 1955, Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere & 
Qin,   2004),  much like  how websites  are  indexed by keywords.  This  associative  nature  of 
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memory  leads  to  problems  of  interference,  in  which  cues  become  associated  with  many 
memories, hindering the retrieval of the information sought. Our memory suffers from both 
proactive interference,  in  which old memories  disrupt  the retrieval  of new information,  and 
retroactive interference, in which new memories disrupt retrieval of old information.
Despite  its  central  importance,  the  role  of  memory  in  cooperation  has  received  little 
attention in the existing literature. In one of the few studies to explore memory and cooperation, 
Milinski and Wedekind  (1998) examined the effects  of working memory on cooperation by 
giving half of their participants a working memory task between interactions. They found that 
without  the  memory  task,  participants  seemed  to  use  a  more  complicated  2-step  memory 
strategy, whereas with the memory interference, they used a simpler 1-step memory, TFT-like 
strategy.  Winkler  et  al.  (2008) introduced  multiple  partners  to  track,  as  well  as  varied  the 
interaction pattern between repeatedly interacting with the same partner before switching to a 
new  one  or  randomly  interacting  with  partners.  When  randomly  interacting  with  partners, 
participants with better recall of biographical information about their partners received higher 
payoffs in the cooperative games—better memory abilities at the individual level resulted in 
higher  payoffs.  These  studies  either  measured  or  manipulated  memory  performance  for 
information outside of the cooperative situation. Here, we test the role of memory for partners’ 
previous actions on cooperation. 
Given the nature of memory, we ask whether existing decision strategies that promote 
cooperation (such as TFT and its variants) are cognitively feasible. We explore whether humans 
have the memory capacity required to implement these strategies. Thus, we are asking whether 
individuals can use strategies like TFT, not whether they do use these strategies. Do they have 
the  requisite  cognitive  capacity?  To address  this  capacity  question,  we designed  a  memory 
experiment  that  tested the role  of  memory interference on the ability to  recall  past  actions. 
Though this study does not mimic real-world cooperative situations, it  is not meant to.  Our 
experimental  design  replicates  the  conditions  under  which  1-  and 2-step  memory strategies 
should work in order to test the underlying cognitive assumptions of these strategies. 
We conducted  an  experiment  with  human participants,  in  which  a  series  of  simulated 
partners chose to cooperate or defect. We measured participants’ memory accuracy in recalling 
each  partner’s  last  action.  To  test  the  effects  of  memory  interference  on  cooperation,  we 
implemented  two  experimental  manipulations.  First,  we  varied  the  number  of  simulated 
partners,  which is  critical  when interactions  between different  partners  are  interleaved (e.g., 
13
partner A, partner B, partner C, partner A, etc.). In this case, an individual may forget a specific 
partner’s previous behaviour due to the intervening interactions interfering with the retrieval of 
the  memory;  more  partners  result  in  more  retroactive  interference.  Second,  we  varied  the 
number of interactions with  each partner, because more previous interactions might interfere 
with the ability to recall  only the single last  interaction (proactive interference).  From these 
manipulations,  we  can  estimate  how  memory  errors  respond  to  increases  in  proactive  and 
retroactive interference. 
Estimates of memory accuracy alone, however, do not demonstrate the complete role of 
memory in cooperation. We must also test how well specific decision strategies cope with error 
caused by misremembering a partner’s last actions. For instance, TFT’s performance decreases 
when errors exist, because mistakenly defecting results in the lower payoffs of mutual defection 
(Molander, 1985). A more forgiving form of TFT called cTFT (Boyd, 1989) outperforms TFT 
when individuals make errors. Although a few strategies have been tested over a few error rates 
(e.g.,  Stephens, Nishimura & Toyer, 1995, Wu & Axelrod, 1995, Rieskamp & Todd, 2006), to 
our knowledge there exists no comprehensive treatment of error on the 1- and 2-step memory 
strategies.  We used agent-based simulations to systematically analyse the success of several 
strategies proposed in the literature across a broader range of error rates. With these and the 
human  memory  results  in  hand,  we  can  determine  whether  currently  proposed  decision 
strategies provide adequate models of cooperative behaviour. 
Cooperative memory experiment
Methods
We recruited 216 participants (age: mean ± SD = 25.4 ± 3.2 years, range = 18–36 years) 
drawn from Berlin universities via the Max Planck Institute for Human Development participant 
pool.  We  prepared  all  materials  in  German  and  programmed  the  experiment  in  E-prime 
experimental software (Schneider, Eschmann & Zuccolotto, 2002a). The programme began by 
asking participants to provide demographic data (sex, age, educational level, occupation, college 
major). 
Before beginning the experiment, participants received a paper copy of instructions (see 
Participant Instructions in Appendix Document A1) describing the goal of the task: recall the 
last  action (cooperate or not cooperate) for each simulated partner.  Participants returned the 
instructions  to  the  experimenter  before  continuing  to  avoid  giving  them a  means  to  record 
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information during the task. A practice phase familiarized participants with the experiment. The 
practice phase was identical to the actual experimental session, except (1) it used fewer trials in 
a fixed order for all participants (three partners with four interactions each and six partners with 
three interactions each), (2) it included only female partners (the experimental phases included 
only male partners), and (3) the money earned did not accumulate for the final payment. At the 
end of the practice session, participants received feedback concerning their success (“You have 
accomplished the practice session with x out of 21 correct answers.”). 
Following  the  practice  phase,  participants  experienced  one  of  the  nine  experimental 
conditions (24 participants—12 males and 12 females—in each condition) that differed in the 
number of simulated partners per group (5, 10, or 15 partners) and the number of interactions 
with each partner (5, 10, or 15 interactions). To keep the number of trials as similar as possible 
for each participant, we replicated some of the conditions several times until the participants 
experienced between 150 and 225 trials. Thus, some conditions had only one replicate, whereas 
others had up to six replicates (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 
Experimental conditions.
Condition # Partners Interactions Replicates Total trials
1 5 5 6 150
2 5 10 3 150
3 5 15 2 150
4 10 5 3 150
5 10 10 2 200
6 10 15 1 150
7 15 5 2 150
8 15 10 1 150
9 15 15 1 225
Each replicate consisted of a series of rounds, each with a different set of partner names 
and images. Participants met with each partner once in a randomized order per round. In the first 
round, we presented individually for each partner  a photograph,  a name,  and an action:  for 
instance, “Ulrich cooperates” (Figure 1.1). All partners were male, and we randomized partner 
names and photos across participants. Participants viewed each partner’s information for 5 s 
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before  advancing  to  the  next  partner  (1  s  in  between  partners).  For  every  trial  in  the 
experimental  phase,  we  randomly  assigned  the  partner’s  action  as  cooperate  or  defect,  so 
participants could not associate a pattern of action with each partner and had to track the exact 
behaviour of each partner in the previous round.
Figure 1.1. Screen shots of the cooperative memory task. In the first round of the task (top row), 
participants observed an image and the name of each partner, along with the current action. 
After viewing this  for each partner,  participants were asked for a partner’s previous choice, 
given feedback on his or her response, and updated on the partner’s new choice before moving 
on to the next partner (middle and bottom rows).  Numbers below screens give presentation 
times for screens and between screens. 
After viewing all members of one group, participants began the retrieval rounds, with a 
randomized order of partners in each round. We presented the image of the partners, along with 
the question “What did (name) do last time?”. The participant had 10 s to answer by pressing 
“k”  or  “n”  [“kooperiert”  (“cooperate”)  or  “nicht  kooperiert”  (“did  not  cooperate”)]  on  the 
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keyboard. If they responded within 10 s, they received a feedback screen for 3 s stating whether 
they were correct, the amount of money they received for that trial (only if they were correct), 
and an updated total amount received so far in the experiment. If they failed to respond in time, 
the participant did not receive feedback, only a reminder to respond more quickly next time. 
After the feedback screen,  participants viewed the new action of the current partner for 5 s 
before  advancing  to  the  next  partner.  In  between  rounds,  participants  could  pause  the 
programme  and  start  a  new round  at  their  discretion.  Afterwards,  participants  completed  a 
questionnaire asking what kinds of strategies they used to solve the memory task, as well as how 
often  they  guessed  and  how  often  they  thought  the  partners  cooperated  (see  Participant 
Questionnaire  in  Appendix  Document  A2).  Participants  received 0.05 Euro for  each correct 
answer and 5 Euro for showing up, earning an average of 11.05 Euro (approximately 14 US 
dollars) per person (range = 8.25–14.60 Euro). We analysed the data using R statistical software 
version 2.12.0 (R Development Core Team, 2010) and the epicalc (Chongsuvivatwong, 2010), 
Hmisc (Harrell, 2010), and lattice (Sarkar, 2008) packages. The original document for this paper 
used Sweave (Leisch, 2002) to embed the R code into the document, thus ensuring reproducible 
research (de Leeuw, 2001).
For the photographs of partners, we used images from Ebner (2008) downloaded from the 
Center  for  Vital  Longevity: 
http://vitallongevity.utdallas.edu/stimuli/facedb/categories/neutralized-faces-by-natalie-
ebner.html. We used 9 images of females for the practice phase and 31 images of males for the 
experimental phase. The depicted persons ranged between 18 and 32 years old, with the same 
background and colour of clothing  (Ebner, 2008). For partner names, we used 40 of the most 
common  male  German  names  from  1958  to  2000  (retrieved  from 
http://www.gfds.de/vornamen/beliebteste-vornamen/).
Results
As shown in Figure 1.2, participants made more errors as group size increased. With a 
group size of 5 partners, participants made errors in a mean (± 95% confidence interval) of 9.5 ± 
2.3% of trials, whereas with 10 and 15 partners, they made errors in 22.5 ± 2.5% and 24.0 ± 
2.5% of trials respectively. Participants performed fairly accurately at the smallest group size, 
but once required to track 10 or more partners, memory errors increased dramatically. In fact, 
the error rates in the 10- and 15-partner conditions suggest that participants were guessing in 
half of the trials. Thus, retroactive interference from tracking multiple partners sharply increased 
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memory errors in this task.
Figure 1.2. Memory error rate  as a function of partner  number and number of interactions. 
Boxplots show that the error rate increased with group size (N = 24 participants in each of nine 
conditions).  The  number  of  interactions  per  partner,  however,  did  not  influence  error  rate. 
Diamonds  represent  the  mean,  lines  represent  the  median,  boxes  represent  the  interquartile 
range, and whiskers represent 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
To further  explore  this  memory interference,  we examined error  as  a  function  of  the 
number  of  intervening interactions.  Between  consecutive  presentations  of  the  same partner, 
there  were  other  intervening partners.  Because  we randomized  the  order  of  presentation  of 
partners within a round structure, we had variation in the number of intervening interactions and 
could  test  whether  more  intervening  events  resulted  in  worse  memory  performance.  When 
consecutive  interactions  with  the  same  partner  occurred  with  no  intervening  interactions, 
participants performed well,  with a mean error rate below 10% (Figure 1.3). With even one 
intervening  interaction,  however,  error  rates  doubled.  With  more  intervening  events,  errors 
continued to increase but at different levels for 5 partners compared to 10 and 15 partners.
With these data, we could estimate a function describing how forgetting increased with the 
number of intervening interactions. When combining the participants experiencing 10 and 15 
partners,  these data were well described by the power function p = 1 - 92(1 + n) -0.08 (R2 = 0.90), 
where  p  represents  the  probability  of  an  error,  and n  represents  the  number  of  intervening 
interactions. A similar analysis on the 5-partner data yielded the power function p = 1 - 96(1 +  
n)-0.04 (R2 = 0.90).  We used a  modified version of  Wickelgren’s  (1974) function,  because  it 
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predicts memory data well (Wixted & Carpenter, 2007).
Figure 1.3. Interference effects on memory accuracy. The mean (± SEM) error rate increased 
with more intervening interactions across all three group sizes (collapsing across the number of 
interactions  per  partner),  with the  effect  more pronounced in group sizes  of  10 or  15.  The 
smooth lines represent the least-squares best-fit Wickelgren’s (1974) power function of memory 
to either the 5-partner data or combined 10- and 15-partner data (for both lines, R2 = 0.90). 
We  also  examined  whether  experiencing  5,  10,  or  15  interactions  with  each  partner 
influenced error  rates. Surprisingly, the number of interactions did not influence performance 
(Figure 1.2). An examination of the trend in error rates across the course of the experimental 
session suggests a general learning effect. Participant errors increased in early rounds, indicating 
that  more interactions  caused more mistakes (Figure 1.4).  Yet,  in  later  rounds,  performance 
almost  returned  to  first-round  levels,  perhaps  due  to  the  participants’ developing  particular 
mnemonic strategies. In a questionnaire after the experiment, we asked participants to describe 
any strategies that they used during the cooperative memory task. A common strategy was to 
memorize  either  the  cooperators  or  defectors  and  then  infer  the  other.  Also,  participants 
frequently tried to focus on either positive (for cooperate) or negative (for defect) features of the 
faces or applied additional letters to the names (e.g., when Tim cooperates, remember Timk or 
Timko). Some elaborate strategies generated stories (e.g.,  “I eventually imagined that all the 
cooperating partners were members of my ‘gang’ and tried to talk myself  into disliking the 
‘traitors’.”). It appears as though participants used specific strategies to help in recall, which 
may account for the decrease in error rates over trials.
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Figure 1.4. Error rate as a function of round number. The mean (± SEM) error rate increased in 
the first three or four rounds before decreasing. 
Males and females did not differ in their error rates (males: 19.2 ± 0.6%; females: 18.8 ± 
0.6%), and participants experienced similar error rates for cooperation and defection actions 
(cooperation:  19.2 ± 0.6%; defection:  18.8 ± 0.6%),  suggesting no preferential  memory for 
defectors or “cheaters” in this  context (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989,  Mealey,  Daood & Krage, 
1996). 
Because both the images and names used as stimuli in this experiment varied in terms of 
attractiveness (Rudolph, Böhm & Lummer, 2007, Ebner, 2008), we examined the mean memory 
performance aggregated  over  all  participants  for  the  images  and names  that  were  rated  for 
attractiveness.  Attractiveness,  however,  did  not  correlate  with  memory performance  for  the 
images (N = 40, r = -0.21, p = 0.19) or names (N = 19, r = -0.10, p = 0.69).
Simulation analysis
Methods
We conducted a set of agent-based simulations in Pascal in which each agent interacted in 






Payoff to Cooperate R = 3 S = 0
Defect T = 5 P = 1
In the simulations, agents used one of nine strategies in the interactions (Table 1.3): all 
cooperate (AllC), all defect (AllD), cTFT, gTFT, Grim Trigger (Grim), Random, TFT, TF2T, 
and WSLS, also known as Pavlov. The population consisted of 11 agents of each strategy type, 
resulting  in  99  total  agents.  Based  on  one  of  the  conditions  from  the  experiment,  agents 
interacted with 10 randomly chosen partners for 10 interaction rounds.  After completing all 
interactions, we summed the payoffs over all interactions for each agent in the population. To 
generate a new population, we ranked all agents by their total fitness and accumulated the total 
population fitness, starting at  the lowest-ranked agent.  We then randomly chose (with equal 
probability) one number from 0 to the accumulated population fitness. The strategy of the agent 
associated with that randomly chosen number was added to the next generation. We repeated 
this procedure (with replacement) until we populated the next generation with 99 agents. In 2% 
of the reproductive events, we randomly mutated the chosen strategy to one of the eight other 
strategies. We continued to produce new generations until all agents in a population played a 
single strategy. Simulations stopped when the entire population consisted of one strategy.
Table 1.3
Strategy descriptions.
Strategy Description (with computer implementation and game-
theoretical definition)
AllC (all cooperate) Always cooperate.
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (1, 1, 1, 1)
AllD (all defect) Always defect.
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0, 0, 0, 0)
cTFT (contrite TFT) Cooperate on the first move, then copy partner’s choice on the 
previous move. If agent mistakenly defects, switch to 
cooperating.
if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
if partner cooperated on previous move, cooperate
if partner defected on previous move & this is your 
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second or third interaction with partner, defect
if partner defected on previous move & this is your 
fourth or more interaction, look at own move before 
previous move:
1) if you cooperated, defect
2) if you defected, look at partner’s second 
previous move:
a) if partner cooperated, cooperate
b) if partner defected, defect
No game-theoretical definition—2-step memory strategy
Grim (Grim Trigger
or Friedman)
Cooperate until partner defects, then always defect.
if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
if partner defected on previous move, defect
if partner cooperated on previous move, look at own 
previous move:
1) if you cooperated, cooperate
2) if you defected, defect
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0, 1, 0, 0)
gTFT (generous TFT) Cooperate on the first move, then copy partner’s choice on 
previous move. If partner defected, cooperate with probability 
0.33.
if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
if partner cooperated on previous move, cooperate
if partner defected on previous move, defect with 
probability 0.66
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (1, 1, 0.33,  
0.33)
Random Randomly choose to cooperate or defect for each move.
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5,  
0.5)
TFT (Tit-For-Tat) Cooperate on the first move, then copy partner’s choice on 
previous move.
if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
if partner cooperated on previous move, cooperate
if partner defected on previous move, defect
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (1, 1, 0, 0)
TF2T (Tit-For-Two-Tats) Cooperate on the first two moves, then copy partner’s choice on 
previous move. If partner defected, look back another move, and 
if partner defected then, defect, otherwise cooperate.
if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
if partner cooperated on previous move, cooperate
if partner defected on previous move & this is your 
second interaction with partner, cooperate
if partner defected on previous move & this is your 
third or more interaction with partner, look at 
partner's second previous move:
1) if partner cooperated, cooperate
2) if partner defected, defect




Cooperate following mutual cooperation or mutual defection, 
otherwise defect.
if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
if you cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate
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if you defected and partner defected, cooperate
if you cooperated and partner defected, defect
if you defected and partner cooperated, defect
Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0, 1, 1, 0)
We  introduced  error  into  the  simulation  by  varying  the  probability  of  an  agent 
“misremembering”—that is, remembering that the partner chose the opposite of what he actually 
chose—in six of the strategies: cTFT, Grim, gTFT, TFT, TF2T, and WSLS. For strategies using 
multiple previous actions from the partner (cTFT, TF2T),  each memory had an independent 
probability of error. 
No memory was necessary for AllC, AllD, and Random, and we assumed perfect memory 
for the agent’s own action in cTFT and WSLS. We varied the error rate from 0 to 50% in 1% 
increments  and  conducted  1,000  simulations  at  each  of  the  51  increments.  We  report  the 
proportion of the 1,000 replications in which each strategy dominated the population (i.e., the 
remaining strategy in the final generation). 
Results
In  the  cooperative  memory task,  even when explicitly  rewarded  for  recalling  the  last  
action of their partners, participants made mistakes in 10–24% of trials. Though these error rates 
seem quite high given that chance performance in this task is 50%, we need a criterion for 
determining whether decision strategies can maintain cooperation at the error rates demonstrated 
by our participants. To determine whether the existing decision strategies can cope with this 
level of error, we assessed how well these strategies performed when making mistakes in an 
agent-based simulation.  Figure  1.5  shows for  each  error  rate  (1)  the  performance  for  each 
strategy  (mean  proportion  of  simulations  in  which  each  strategy  outcompeted  all  other 
strategies)  and (2)  the  proportion  of  interactions  in  the  last  generation  in  which  the  agents 
cooperated. At low error rates, Grim—a strategy that begins by cooperating, then permanently 
switches to defection following the partner’s first defection—outperformed all other strategies. 
Though at  odds with Axelrod and Hamilton’s  (1981) original  results,  this  finding replicated 
results from Linster (1992) in which Grim dominated the populations in the absence of errors. 
Additionally, AllD, WSLS, TFT, and cTFT won a small percentage of the simulations. As error 
rates  increased,  AllD and Grim outcompeted  TFT and the  other  cooperative strategies.  The 
frequency of cooperative acts employed by all agents in the population decreased dramatically 
as  errors  became  more  prevalent.  This  decrease  in  cooperation  reflected  how  the  various 
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strategies such as Grim switched from cooperating to defecting when memory errors increased. 
Thus, cooperation could not be sustained, even at low levels of error. 
Figure 1.5. Agent-based simulations of error rate effects. When varying error rates across a 
range of values, Grim, cTFT, TFT, WSLS, and AllD survived with few errors (we do not show 
strategies with success rates lower than 0.05%). At higher rates (e.g., error rates observed in the 
experiment  are  shaded),  however,  AllD  and  Grim  outperformed  the  other  strategies.  The 
proportion of cooperative choices made by all agents in the last generation decreased rapidly 
with increasing error rate. 
To further assess the role of error on cooperation, we embedded the forgetting functions 
from our experimental data into the agents in our simulation. Instead of using a fixed error rate 
as in the previous simulation, we conducted a simulation in which the error rate depended on the 
number  of  intervening  interactions,  and  we  drew  that  error  rate  from the  fitted  forgetting 
function from the memory experiment. All other aspects of the simulation were the same as 
above, and we conducted 1,000 replications of this simulation. 
Using  this  forgetting  function  to  assign  memory  error  as  a  function  of  number  of 
intervening events yielded results similar to the fixed-rate analysis. AllD won around 83.0% of 
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the simulations, whereas Grim won 17.0%, and only 6.2% of interactions involved cooperation. 
Even when using  a  lower-error  forgetting  function  based on the  5-partner  condition  of  the 
experiment,  only strategies AllD and Grim performed well  (winning 74.5 and 24.5% of the 
simulations,  respectively),  and  we  observed  cooperation  rates  of  12.8%.  The  cooperative 
strategies that depend on memory of partners’ last action failed when confronted with a realistic, 
forgetful memory.
Game-theoretical analysis
To verify our agent-based simulation results, we also used analytical methods to assess the 
role of error  on cooperation by applying evolutionary game theory  (Maynard Smith,  1982). 
Evolutionary game-theoretical analyses seek an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), that is, a 
strategy  that,  when  adopted  by  all  members  of  a  population,  cannot  be  outperformed  (or 
invaded) by any alternative strategy. If a strategy A playing against itself has a higher payoff 
than any alternative strategy has against A [payoff(A, A) > payoff(alt, A)], that strategy A is an 
ESS. If  the payoffs are  the same,  then A must  have a  higher  payoff  against  the alternative 
strategy than the alternative strategy has against itself [payoff(A, alt) > payoff(alt, alt)] to be an 
ESS. Because we are interested in how error influences the payoffs of many strategies, we used 
Stephens et al.’s (1995) technique to calculate ESSes with error. This technique, however, only 
applies  to  strategies  that  use  information  from the  single  last  interaction.  Including  earlier 
interactions greatly complicates the analysis, so we limited this analysis to the seven strategies 
that use only the last interaction: AllC, AllD, Grim, gTFT, Random, TFT, WSLS (Table 1.3). We 
used  the  standard  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  matrix  (Table  1.2)  and  set  the  probability  of  future 
interaction to α = 0.9 to approximate the 10 interactions used in our experiment. To estimate the 
payoffs for the remaining strategies (cTFT and TF2T), we used an agent-based simulation with 
two agents (one was either cTFT or TF2T and the other was one of the nine strategies) playing 
10 interactions for 10,000 replicates. We calculated or simulated the payoffs to each strategy 
against each other strategy with error rates ranging from 0 to 50% in 1% increments. 
We  corroborated  the  simulation  finding  with  a  game-theoretical  analysis.  Figure  1.6 
illustrates  the   game-theoretical  payoffs  of  all  strategies  categorized  by the  strategy against 
which the others play (the “population” strategy). When the payoffs of a strategy playing against 
itself exceed the payoffs of all other strategies against it, the strategy is an ESS for these error  
rates. AllD was an ESS over the entire range of error rates. Grim was an ESS at error rates 
between 12 and 18%, validating its performance in the evolutionary simulation around that error 
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rate (Figure 1.5). CTFT was an ESS at error rates between 0 and 17%, although these results are  
simulated  and  must  be  viewed  with  caution.  Otherwise,  none  of  the  other  strategies  was 
evolutionarily stable for this range of parameters.
Figure 1.6. Game-theoretical payoffs of strategies as a function of error rate. For each strategy, 
we calculated how all strategies perform against that strategy over a range of error rates. When 
the strategy playing against itself has a higher payoff than any other strategy playing against it, 
this is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Strategies cTFT and TF2T were simulated rather 
than analytically calculated. 
Discussion
The goal of this study was to test the psychological plausibility of the memory assumption 
implicitly embedded in models  of  decision  strategies  for  repeated social  interactions.  These 
strategies  assume  that  behaviour  in  a  social  interaction  depends  on  the  precise  recall  of  a 
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partner’s past actions. We show that human participants have great difficulty accurately recalling 
the previous actions of simulated partners. Interference associated with tracking the behaviour of 
partners degrades memory performance, and having more partners results in worse performance. 
To assess whether the decision strategies proposed in the literature can sustain cooperation in the 
face of error, we conducted simulations of a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which the 
agents sometimes forgot their partner’s past actions. When mapping the experimental results 
onto  the  simulation  results,  we  see  that,  in  our  simulation  scenario,  cooperation  is  not 
maintained, because few cooperative strategies perform well at the error rates shown by the 
experimental data. Instead, defection dominates with these estimates of error. These results held 
even  when  we  used  estimates  of  the  best  memory  performance  observed  in  our  memory 
experiments. Of course, the results of the simulations are dependent on the strategies included 
and  the  parameters  used.  Nevertheless,  these  findings  support  the  notion  that  a  complete 
understanding  of  cooperation  requires  investigating  the  underlying  cognition  needed  to 
implement those strategies (Stephens, McLinn & Stevens, 2002, Hammerstein, 2003, Stevens & 
Hauser, 2004, Stevens et al., 2005, Furlong & Opfer, 2009).
One limitation of our experiment is the artificial nature of the task, a limitation shared by 
most  other  cooperation  experiments  in  psychology  and  economics.  More  realistic  social 
interactions  might  trigger  more  effective  memory  performance,  so  we  should  pay  careful 
attention to how cooperation evolves with error rates lower than what we observed. Though 
aspects of the task may be artificial, in some ways, our memory task actually underestimates 
error. For instance, we use rather small group sizes, ranging from 5 to 15 individuals. Estimates 
from  Christmas  card  lists  in  England  suggest  average  social  network  sizes  around  125 
individuals  (Hill  & Dunbar, 2003). Tracking the behaviour of this many individuals is quite 
daunting and likely would greatly increase the error rate. Additionally, our study minimizes the 
influence  of  events  outside  of  the  cooperative  interactions  on  memory  accuracy.  In  more 
realistic settings, many more aspects of real life may interfere with accurate memory. We asked 
participants to recall behaviour after rather short delays and with only a few intervening events. 
In our day-to-day lives, we constantly encode memories that may interfere with our ability to 
recall,  with  retention  intervals  extending  into  days,  weeks,  months,  or  even  years  between 
interactions. More realistic situations with larger numbers of social partners and longer time 
delays between interactions could actually make memory worse than that observed in our study. 
Thus, our task may be too difficult in some ways and too easy in others, but in either case, the 
strategies in question need to track behaviour with an exquisite memory.
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Most empirical studies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma involve repeated interactions with the 
same  opponent.  We  created  a  more  realistic  situation  by  including  multiple  partners  and 
interleaving interactions among partners (Winkler et al., 2008). A further improvement might be 
to offer a skewed interaction pattern. Rather than meeting all partners the same number of times, 
participants could have interacted more frequently with some partners than others, a pattern we 
observe in natural social encounters  (Pachur, Schooler & Stevens, in press). These patterns of 
contact  have  interesting  implications  for  cooperation,  because  the  frequency  of  contact 
influences the expected time between contacts. Thus, retention intervals vary for tracking the 
previous behaviour of more versus less frequently contacted social partners. 
Finally, in our task, we attempted to make the cooperation and defection events equally 
salient,  but  real  cooperative  interactions  are  much more  heterogeneous:  opening a  door  for 
someone will not be remembered in the same way as cheating on a spouse. The salience or 
magnitude of costs or benefits of the cooperative or defection event likely contributes to the 
retention of the memory (Mealey et al., 1996, Rankin & Eggimann, 2009). Yet, our analysis with 
lower-error rates (forgetting function based on the 5-partner condition) still  showed minimal 
cooperation  rates,   indicating  that  better  memory  performance  is  not  enough  to  sustain 
cooperation—near perfect memory is required. More importantly,  we designed a task that is 
ecologically valid for TFT and the other decision strategies under investigation. These strategies 
do  not  invoke  emotional  salience  or  differential  encoding  of  behaviour  depending  on  the 
magnitude of costs or benefits. They all simply store a binary value (cooperate or defect) for 
each  partner.  Adding  salience  and  magnitude  effects  means  developing  and  testing  new 
strategies, a path we fully endorse. 
How might we circumvent the problem of memory in cooperation? Or, put another way, 
why do we see cooperation in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma situations? There are at least two 
possibilities.  The  first  is  methodological.  Many  studies  of  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  have 
participants  play  against  a  single  partner  repeatedly.  This  may  facilitate  cooperation  both 
because it  provides much experience with a  partner  and because it  limits  the memory load 
associated with the more realistic scenario of tracking multiple partners. The second reason why 
we may see cooperation in these tasks is that people are using different strategies than those 
currently proposed in the literature. One possibility is a kind of meta-strategy in which people 
use TFT when they can remember past interactions and use another strategy when they cannot 
remember. Though this meta-strategy has not been investigated theoretically, people could use 
something like this to reciprocate. Alternatively, people may be using a longer-term reciprocal 
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strategy. Instead of relying solely on the most recent behaviour when cooperating, they may 
build a reputation for partners, accounting for experience over several interactions  (Roberts, 
2008). People may implement reciprocal strategies that classify partners into types instead of 
track  all  individual  choices.  Though we focused here  exclusively on direct  experience  with 
partners, people also likely use indirect experience by observing third-party interactions to build 
an image score for potential partners (Roberts, 2008, Rankin & Eggimann, 2009). Thus, instead 
of tracking individual interactions, people may encode more general summaries of behaviour, 
drawn from both personal experience and observing other interactions. 
Rather than test how people actually make cooperative decisions, our intention here was to 
test  whether  the  current  decision  strategies  provide  a  suitable  framework  for  exploring 
cooperation.  We  suggest  that,  though  these  models  have  proven  valuable  in  investigating 
cooperation for the last 30 years, they do not accurately reflect underlying cognition. Humans 
certainly use reciprocal strategies when cooperating, but they likely do not use strategies like 
TFT and its relatives. Our results suggest that they simply cannot use these strategies, because 
the memory load is too great. To examine the types of reciprocal strategies that humans and 
other animals use, we must embed what we know about memory into new realistic cooperative 
strategies. Building psychology into these models is a crucial next step in better understanding 
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Chapter 2 is based on the paper with the same title that resulted from collaboration with 
Jörg Rieskamp and Jeffrey R. Stevens (Volstorf, Rieskamp & Stevens, 2011). To comply with 
the rest of the thesis, I changed American into British English and adapted the numbering of 
tables and figures to be chapter specific. Available with the original paper are the participants’ 
data, but because these would fill almost 20 pages, I omit them here and refer the interested 
reader  to  the  source  at  http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi
%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0018945.
In helping to  make this  paper  what  it  is,  we would especially like to  thank Michaela 
Riediger  for  letting  us  access  the  FACES database  and Sebastian  Scholz  for  the  additional 
pictures, Gregor  Caregnato for testing the participants, Henrik Olsson, Nadine Fleischhut, Ana 
Sofia  Morais,  and the  ABC research  group for  helpful  comments,  Pat  Barclay for  his  kind 
correspondence and making the reanalysis of his data convenient, Edgar Erdfelder for his patient 
and thorough support with the multinomial processing tree model, Axel Buchner and Raoul Bell 
for sharing their submitted manuscript and the results on the reanalysis of Barclay’s data, and 
two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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Abstract
For cooperation to evolve via direct reciprocity, individuals must track their partners’ 
behaviour to avoid exploitation. With increasing size of the interaction group, however, memory 
becomes error prone. To decrease memory effort, people could categorize partners into types, 
distinguishing cooperators and cheaters. We explored two ways in which people might 
preferentially track one partner type: remember cheaters or remember the rare type in the 
population. We assigned participants to either of three interaction groups which differed in the 
proportion of computer partners’ types (defectors rare, equal proportion, or cooperators rare). 
We extended research on both hypotheses in two ways. First, participants experienced their 
partners repeatedly by interacting in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Second, we tested 
categorization of partners as cooperators or defectors in memory tests after a short and long 
retention interval (10 min and 1 week). Participants remembered rare partner types better than 
they remembered common ones at both retention intervals. We propose that the flexibility of 




Which do you remember better, an interaction partner who treated you nicely or one who 
harmed you? Here, we investigated which kind of partner type people remember preferentially, 
the “good” or the “bad”.
Humans cooperate  in  a  variety of  contexts  (e.g.,  Henrich  & Henrich,  2007),  although 
cooperators risk exploitation by cheaters’ accepting but not repaying the beneficial  act.  One 
mechanism  proposed  to  explain  cooperation  between  genetically  unrelated  individuals  is 
reciprocal  dependence  in  repeated  interactions:  For  a  cheater  who  will  meet  the  exploited 
partner again, the costs of future withheld cooperation by that partner may outweigh the benefits 
of the current exploitation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981,  Trivers, 1971). A prerequisite for this 
direct reciprocity is to identify each partner and remember the history of interactions—an error-
prone memory would invite partners to cheat. 
Although  memory  of  the  partners’ behaviour  is  an  important  building  block  for  the 
emergence of cooperation (Stevens et al., 2005), storing all actions of all partners is not feasible 
for the boundedly rational human mind (Simon, 1956). Time (i.e., the delay until the next access 
to the information in memory) causes information traces to decay (Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991), 
and new and existing knowledge interferes with accurate recall. A study by Stevens, Volstorf,  
Schooler,  and  Rieskamp  (2011) showed  that  even  tracking  the  single  last  action  of  each 
interaction partner, as many of the proposed reciprocal strategies such as Tit-For-Tat demand 
(Axelrod, 1984), led to high memory error rates. In an evolutionary simulation, these errors 
resulted in a sharp reduction in cooperation. So, remembering either the complete interaction 
history or the single last action of each partner seem to be ruled out as potential candidates for  
the memory processes underlying cooperation. An alternative strategy could be to categorize 
partners into types reflecting their general behaviour, for example “cooperator” and “defector”, 
and remember these types. Compared to constantly updating each partners’ actions, the type is a 
more stable criterion and, therefore,  decreases memory effort.  Although categorizing partner 
types  may  ease  memory  requirements,  the  information  on  partner  types  is  susceptible  to 
forgetting, too. Here, we investigated two hypotheses, the “cheater-memory” and the “rarity” 
hypothesis, that both propose to remember one partner type preferentially and infer the other, 
thereby reducing  memory load.  Barclay  (2008) and  Bell,  Buchner,  and Musch  (2010) also 
addressed these hypotheses, and we extended their approaches by giving participants repeated 
experience with their partners and testing memory after both a short and long retention interval.
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Remember cheaters
One  hypothesis  predicts  that,  to  reduce  fitness  costs  associated  with  exploitation, 
individuals  will  remember  cheaters  preferentially.  According  to  error  management  theory 
(Haselton & Buss, 2000), exploitation by a defector is worse than missing out on a cooperative 
opportunity. To prevent exploitation, individuals would not only benefit from detecting cheaters 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989), but because more important information has priority in memory 
than less important one  (Schulz,  1971),  they would also benefit  from remembering cheaters 
preferentially (Mealey et al., 1996). We term this the cheater-memory strategy.
In an environment with a majority of cooperators,  preferentially remembering the few 
cheaters  reduces  the  probability  of  memory  errors  and  related  costs.  Some  environments, 
however, may contain a majority of cheaters and here, adhering to the cheater-memory strategy 
would not reduce memory load much. 
Remember the rare type
The  second  hypothesis  emphasizes  the  costs  of  memory  rather  than  the  costs  of 
exploitation.  Individuals  cope  with  a  variety  of  environments,  and,  so,  rather  than  always 
remember cheaters, they might benefit from a memory strategy that adapts to different contexts. 
Such  an  ecologically  rational  (Todd  &  Gigerenzer,  2007) strategy  would  preferentially 
remember the less frequent partner type (Barclay, 2008). This does not just reduce the amount of 
information to retain but also potential memory errors. We term this the rarity strategy.
In  addition  to  reducing  memory load,  focusing  on  the  rare  type  could  be  beneficial, 
because it is novel and striking. Since 1933 (von Restorff, 1933), researchers have investigated 
why people better remember distinctive events. The reason, according to Hunt (2006), is not an 
objects’ property  but  the  objects’ processing  via  increased  attention  and  memory.  Schmidt 
(1991) proposed the incongruity hypothesis, which provides a combination of property- and 
process-explanations  and  allows  adaptation  to  the  environment.  Given  this  definition,  one 
partner type may be preferentially remembered in one context (i.e., an interaction group where it 
is in the minority) but not in another (i.e., an interaction group where it is in the majority).
Testing cheater-memory and rarity strategies
With  this  study,  we  explored  two  hypotheses  regarding  which  partner  type  people 
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remember preferentially.
1. According to the cheater-memory strategy, cheaters are remembered better than cooperators, 
regardless of the number of cheaters or cooperators in the environment.
2. According to the rarity strategy, the rare partner type in an environment is remembered better 
than the common one; for example, people remember cheaters better only when these are in 
the minority in the environment.
Adhering to the basic procedure of partner-type memory studies since the seminal paper 
by Mealey et al. (1996), we evaluated participants’ memory of the partners by mixing the faces 
we had presented to participants, the old faces, with new faces. Then, for each face, we asked 
whether participants had seen it in the beginning of the experiment (recognition; e.g., Mealey et 
al., 1996, Barclay & Lalumière, 2006, Chiappe et al., 2004). Incorporating Mehl and Buchner’s 
(2008) suggestion that recognition alone cannot be evolutionarily beneficial, because it does not 
allow  a  sufficient  partner  identification,  we  additionally  asked  whether  the  partner  was  a 
defector  or  cooperator  (categorization).  To test  the hypotheses,  we varied the  proportion of 
partner types in the interaction group. This has also been done by Barclay (2008) and Bell et al. 
(2010) who each found support for a rarity strategy. The design of both studies, however, left 
open two questions that we addressed here.
Does experience influence categorization?
To indicate  that partners are cooperators  or defectors,  some researchers provided each 
partner’s face with a description of cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour (e.g.,  Mealey et 
al.,  1996),  Chiappe at  al.,  2004,  Farrelly & Turnbull,  2009).  Barclay and Lalumière  (2006) 
criticized these descriptions, as participants could perceive the degree of cheating as higher as 
that of cooperation,  which could lead to a stronger encoding of the cheaters.  Moreover,  we 
believe that behaviour descriptions likely do not have a large enough impact on participants’ 
behaviour  and  memory  (see  Gigerenzer  &  Hug,  1992 concerning  the  importance  of  the 
perspective  on  the  cheater-detection  mechanism  in  social-contract  violations).  In  contrast, 
testing partner-type memory using an economic game (e.g., Oda, 1997, Singer, Kiebel, Winston, 
Dolan & Frith, 2004) has two advantages. First, games avoid uncertainties about the degree of 
cooperation  and  defection.  In  a  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game,  for  example,  cooperation  and 
defection are not indicated by example descriptions but one of two choices (cooperate/defect) 
the partner takes, and these choices are associated with a payoff matrix. Second, participants 
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experience  the  consequences  of  their  partners’  behaviour  directly.  Rather  than  having 
participants evaluate whether partners with little relation to their welfare have violated social 
contract or hazard management rules, using a game affects participants immediately, because the 
payoff  depends  on  their  own  and  the  partner’s  decision.  Compared  to  pure  behaviour 
descriptions,  the  strategic  nature  of  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  likely  triggers  behaviour  and 
memory processes for tracking cooperators and defectors.
Barclay  (2008) and Bell et al.  (2010) employed economic games but in a limited way. 
Barclay (2008) only announced to participants what their partners would do in a trust game that 
followed the memory test. Bell et al. (2010) emphasized the importance of personal involvement 
for partner-type memory and let participants experience their partners in a trust game, but it was 
one-shot and gave participants just a single instance of the type of partner they were facing. We 
believe it  is more realistic if  participants are not just confronted with a label or a one-time 
experience  but  meet  their  partners  repeatedly  (Hertwig  &  Ortmann,  2001).  This  enables 
participants to infer the partners’ types on their own and increases the recognition accuracy, as 
people remember self-generated items better than ready-made ones  (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). 
Repeated interactions also mimic situations outside the lab in which remembering with whom to 
cooperate  and  with  whom  not  to  cooperate  is  the  prerequisite  for  establishing  reciprocal 
relationships.
How robust are the memory strategies to longer retention intervals?
The majority of studies on partner-type memory tested recognition (and categorization) in 
a memory test  after  either  several  minutes (Barclay,  2008,  Chiappe et  al.,  2004,  Farrelly & 
Turnbull,  2009,  Singer et al.,  2004,  Bell & Buchner, 2009) or 1 week (Mealey et al.,  1996, 
Barclay & Lalumière, 2006,  Oda, 1997) following the initial presentation of the partners by 
mixing the familiar with new partners. We investigated whether the memory effort associated 
with longer retention intervals influences the memory strategies. Thus, we asked participants for 
recognition and categorization of partners after retention intervals of both 10 min and 1 week. 
Though others have tested the effect of a short and long retention interval in cheater-memory 
studies (Mehl & Buchner, 2008, Buchner, Bell, Mehl & Musch, 2009), no one has done so for 
the rarity strategy.
In  sum,  to  test  the  cheater-memory  versus  rarity  hypothesis,  we  had  participants 
experience their computer partners’ types in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We varied the 
proportion  of  defectors  and (conditional)  cooperators  among  partners  in  a  between-subjects 
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design. Then, participants answered recognition and categorization questions in a memory test 
after 10 minutes and again after 1 week.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The ethics committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development approved the 
study. Participants signed an informed consent before proceeding with the experiment.
Participants
Our lab recruited 126 participants (63 males, 63 females; mean [M] age = 26, range = 18–
37,  median  [Mdn]  =  26,  mode [Mo]  =  25)  from the  Berlin  universities,  97 of  which  were 
students or in training. We excluded one participant for the analysis of the second session due to  
technical problems.
Stimuli and materials
For interaction partners, our design required 68 images of males and females with neutral 
facial expressions (participants and depicted volunteers were roughly of the same age). We used 
58  colour  portraits  from  the  database  FACES  (Ebner,  Riediger  &  Lindenberger,  2010; 
http://faces.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/album/escidoc:57488), with the volunteers wearing grey shirts, 
no make up or  jewellery,  sitting in  front  of  a  dark-grey background.  For  the remaining 10 
images, we photographed students at the Technical University of Chemnitz in the same way as 
the  FACES  portraits.  We  randomly  assigned  popular  German  names  (from  the  website 
http://www.beliebte-  vornamen.de/  ) to the images for each participant. To avoid confusion about 
and interpretation of the faces, we informed the participants about the neutral character of the 
images.
We  programmed  and  presented  the  experiment  with  E-Prime  experimental  software 
(Schneider  et  al.,  2002a,  Schneider,  Eschmann & Zuccolotto,  2002b)  (programme available 
upon request). Participants received a written copy of the instructions during the experiment. 
The instructions contained the procedure of the interactions, illustrated with screen shots from 
the programme (Appendix Document B1; original German instructions available upon request). 
In explaining the interactions in the instructions, we neither mentioned the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
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nor the words  game,  payoff, or  player. Instead, we instructed participants that the aim of the 
experiment  was  to  engage  in  a  social  interaction  with  a  partner  with  whom  they  cannot 
correspond. An example illustrated this. The participants did not know about the memory task 
beforehand. As the final task, participants completed a questionnaire (Appendix Document B2) 
concerning their possible strategies and other remarks.
Procedure
The experiment involved two sessions separated by a mean of 7 days (range = 5–10 days,  
Mdn = 7, Mo = 7). The first session consisted of five phases and took approximately 80 min; the 
second session comprised four phases and lasted about 40 min.
Session 1
After the participants had read the written instructions, we tested their understanding of 
the payoff matrix (Table 2.1) in the first phase of the session. We presented them with the four 
possible  game outcomes (for  example:  “I  cooperate,  the partner  refuses to  cooperate.”)  and 
asked  them  to  indicate  each  time  how  many  points  they  and  their  partner  would  receive 
according to the payoff matrix. They had to answer all situations correctly to continue to the 
next  phase;  otherwise,  they repeated  the  phase  (90  participants  answered all  four  questions 
correctly after one round, 34 after two rounds, one after three rounds, one after six rounds). 
Table 2.1 
The Payoff for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Player’s Choice Partner’s Choice
Cooperate Refuse 
Cooperate 3 ; 3 0 ; 5
Refuse 5 ; 0 1 ; 1
Note. Payoff on the left in each cell is paid to the player, on the right to the partner.
In the second phase, participants practised the interaction task by experiencing a series of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games in which they chose to cooperate or defect with each partner. The 
accumulated points, however, did not contribute to their final payment. Participants experienced 
four interaction partners whom they met for three interactions each (i.e., 12 encounters). Of the 
interaction partners, two were defectors (one male, one female) and two were cooperators (one 
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male,  one  female).  Afterwards,  participants  received  feedback  about  their  success  (“You 
accomplished the practice session with [number] points profit. It would have been possible to 
achieve 14 to 24 points.”) and had the possibility for a short break.
The  third  phase  was  the  actual  interaction  task  in  which  we  converted  the  payoff 
participants received into money.  We randomly assigned participants to three conditions (42 
participants in each condition) that differed in the proportion of partner types among the 20 
computer partners. In the “defectors-rare” condition, 20% of interaction partners defected, 80% 
cooperated.  In  the “equal-proportion”  condition,  50% defected,  50% cooperated,  and in  the 
“cooperators-rare”  condition,  80%  of  partners  defected  and  20%  cooperated.  Each  type 
comprised  half  male  and  half  female  partners.  Whereas  defector  partners  always  defected, 
cooperator  partners  played  Tit-For-Tat,  which  starts  by  cooperating  and  then  copies  the 
participant’s previous action. Implementing a strategy that reacts to the participants’ behaviour 
maintains attention to the partner type. If participants faced a purely cooperative strategy, they 
might  defect  throughout  to  receive  the  highest  payoff,  losing  the  motivation  to  distinguish 
between the partner types. We informed participants that the partners were not human players 
but pursued strategies that had been identified in humans in experimental contexts before. They 
knew about neither the number nor nature of the partners’ strategies.
In the first  block of interactions,  participants met each of their  20 partners once.  This 
procedure was repeated for 10 blocks, with a random order each time. Each encounter began 
with the presentation of the partner (Figure 2.1). After 4 s, the next screen asked participants to 
either cooperate or refuse to cooperate with the partner and showed a picture of the payoff 
matrix. Participants had 10 s to respond; otherwise, this interaction was skipped, and they were 
asked to answer more quickly next time. The subsequent screens displayed the decision of the 
partner for 3 s and finally gave a summary of the interaction for 2 s.
After a distraction task in which participants completed a shortened version of an episodic 
memory task (Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li & Lindenberg, 2008, Pachur, Mata & Schooler, 2009) 
in  10–15 min,  the final  phase of the first  session was the memory task (Figure 2.1).  Here, 
participants  saw images  of  the  20  old  partners  mixed  with  20  new ones  (half  males,  half 
females) and, for each partner, had to answer three questions. The first screen presented the 
partner for 4 s. Then, participants had 5 s to decide whether they had seen the partner before 
(recognition).  They  did  not  receive  feedback  on  their  success.  Second,  they  rated  the 
cooperativeness of the current partner on a scale from 0 (no cooperative actions) to 100 (always  
40
cooperative) and, third, categorized him or her as a defector or cooperator. On the latter two 
questions there was no time limit. Participants repeated this memory task for each partner.
Figure 2.1. Example procedure of the interaction and the memory task. Screen presentation 
times are noted below. The original pictures were in colour.
Session 2
After  a  mean of  7  days,  participants  returned for  the  second session.  They began by 
reading  the  written  instructions  and  then  proceeded  with  the  memory  task.  We  presented 
participants with the 20 old partners from the first experimental session and 20 new partners 
(half males, half females) they had not seen in any phase before. The procedure of the memory 
task was the same as in the first session.
Afterwards, participants had the opportunity for a short break and then experienced three 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games with 20 partners from the memory task. Half of these partners were 
old, the other half participants had not seen before. The proportion of types among the partners 
conformed to the conditions like in the first session, and, again, each type comprised half male 
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and half female partners. The procedure of the interactions was the same as in Session 1. Then, 
participants completed the distraction task,  and, in  the final phase,  they answered questions 
concerning their strategies in the two sessions. Finally, participants received 5 Euro show-up fee 
per session. Additionally, we paid participants according to the overall points received in the 
interaction task in both sessions by multiplying their gains with 0.02, 0.03, and 0.06 Euro in the 
defectors-rare,  equal-proportion,  and  cooperators-rare  condition  to  equate  the  total  payment 
across  conditions  (rangeDefectors  Rare =  7.98–13.40  Euro;  rangeEqual  Proportion =  10.11–13.86 Euro; 
rangeCooperators Rare = 9.36–19.56 Euro). Although participants received different numbers of points 
due to the proportion of partner types in the conditions,  this  did not influence the absolute 
number of partners correctly recognized and categorized. Participants did not know about the 
different  exchange  rates  when  making  their  choices  and  categorizations,  so  this  could  not 
influence the results.
Design and data analysis
As the independent variable, we varied the proportion of defectors and cooperators in the 
interaction group in a between-subjects design (defectors rare,  equal proportion,  cooperators 
rare). As the main dependent variables, we assessed recognition and categorization judgements, 
as well as a quantitative cooperativeness evaluation for each partner. Moreover, we collected 
choice data—the participants’ proportions of defection against and cooperation with partners—
to  check  whether  participants  were  able  to  distinguish  between  the  partner  types.  With 
descriptive statistics, we present mean, standard deviation, median, and mode; for comparisons 
between proportions, we give the mean with 95% confidence interval (e.g., Cumming, Fidler & 
Vaux, 2007) and Cohen’s (1977) h effect size (Cohen’s conventions: small effect size: h = 0.20, 
medium effect size:  h = 0.50, large effect size:  h = 0.80). If the proportions are compared to 
chance performance at 50% (i.e., 0.5), we report Cohen’s g (Cohen’s conventions: small effect 
size: g = 0.05, medium effect size: g = 0.15, large effect size: g = 0.25). When comparing results 
between sessions or repetitions, we accounted for within-subject variation by applying Morey’s 
(2008) correction of Cousineau’s (2005) transformation for confidence intervals. To evaluate the 
recognition  performance,  we  provide  Snodgrass-Corwin-corrected  d’ measurements  (e.g., 
Schooler & Shiffrin, 2005).
We looked for the cheater-memory and rarity strategy in the categorization accuracy in 
conjunction with correct recognition of old partners, because also in everyday life one must do 
both—correctly  recognize  and  correctly  categorize  to  sufficiently  identify  a  partner.  In  the 
42
memory research literature, this measure is called SIM, source identification measure (Bröder & 
Meiser,  2007),  and  is  calculated  as  the  number  of  correct  categorizations  given  correct 
recognition  over  the  number  of  all  answers  (correct  recognition  and  correct  categorization, 
correct recognition and incorrect categorization,  incorrect recognition) for each partner type. 
Because participants make errors and guess when categorizing partners, the data analysis should 
account for guessing biases (Barclay, 2008, Bell et al., 2010, Bell & Buchner, 2009, Buchner et 
al.,  2009).  We calculated  chance  levels,  that  is,  the  accuracy achieved  by guessing,  as  the 
proportion of categorized defectors and cooperators any time participants recognized a partner, 
whether old or new, as old and corrected the raw accuracy rates for these chance levels.
Results
Exclusion of participants
Participants who almost never cooperated experienced only minimal cooperation by Tit-
For-Tat  partners  and,  thus,  could  hardly  distinguish  between  the  partner  types.  From these 
participants, we did not expect proper partner identification in the memory task. We excluded 27 
participants (four, 11, and 12 participants from the three conditions) who cooperated with Tit-
For-Tat partners in at most 13% of the cases. At this percentage, there seemed to be a natural gap 
in the data. The next nearest value of “percentage of cooperation with cooperator partners” in 
the defectors-rare, equal-proportion, and cooperators-rare condition was at 18%, 27%, and 20%. 
All  further  analyses,  therefore,  used  only  the  data  from the  remaining  99  participants.  By 
excluding 27 participants,  the mean proportion  of  cooperation with  defector  and cooperator 
partners  increased,  specifically  for  the  equal-proportion  and  cooperators-rare  condition. 
Moreover,  the  mean  cooperativeness  evaluation  of  cooperator  partners  increased.   The 
categorization  accuracy increased,  specifically  for  the  equal-proportion  and cooperators-rare 
condition.  All  in  all,  however,  by excluding the  27  participants,  the  results  did  not  change 
dramatically. Additionally, we excluded cooperativeness evaluations from one participant in the 
defectors-rare  condition  in  both  sessions  who  seemed  to  have  misunderstood  the  task  and 
evaluated partners categorized as defectors with values around 96.2 (SD = 7.4) and partners 




Participants  experienced  10  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  interactions  with  each  partner.  To 
maximize their  payoff  (Table 2.1),  participants  should defect  against  a  defector  partner  and 
cooperate with a cooperator partner. Whereas participants cooperated with defectors less than 
expected by chance in all conditions, they cooperated with cooperators more than expected by 
chance only when cooperators were common (in the defectors-rare condition; g = 0.08; Figure 
2.2)  and when both  partner  types  had an equal  proportion  (g = 0.05).  Yet,  we found more 
cooperation with cooperators than defectors in all conditions, and participants cooperated more 
with cooperators when they were common (in the defectors-rare condition; M = 58.0% ± 7.7 CI) 
than when they were rare (M = 48.5% ± 7.4 CI; h = 0.20; no difference between the other 
conditions).
Figure 2.2. Proportion of cooperation with defector and cooperator partners. The dashed line 
represents chance performance. In the defectors-rare condition, of the 20 interaction partners 
20% were defectors and 80% cooperators (Tit-For-Tat). The equal-proportion condition included 
50% defectors and 50% cooperators, and the cooperators-rare condition included 80% defectors 
and 20% cooperators. The ns give the number of participants per partner type. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.
We did not expect these low rates of cooperation with cooperator partners, but the analysis 
across the 10 repetitions revealed that the mean cooperative behaviour increased from 40.8% ± 
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5.8 CI in the first round to 71.0% ± 4.3 CI in the tenth round (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3. Proportion of cooperation across repetitions. The figure shows the mean proportion 
of  cooperation  (±  95%  confidence  intervals)  with  cooperator  partners  across  the  repeated 
interactions in the first and second session. Confidence intervals are corrected to account for 
within-subject variation (Morey, 2008).
Session 2
Figure  2.2  shows  participants’  cooperative  behaviour,  averaged  across  the  three 
interactions, in the second session after about 1 week. This time, participants cooperated both 
with defectors less than expected by chance and with cooperators more than expected by chance 
in all conditions (gDefectors  Rare = 0.32,  gEqual Proportion = 0.25,  gCooperators  Rare = 0.15). They seemed to 
distinguish between the partner types and acted accordingly. Consequently, the proportion of 
cooperation with cooperators in the beginning of the second session (M = 72.9% ± 3.2 CI) was 
at the level of the tenth repetition in the first session (M = 71.0% ± 4.3 CI; Figure 2.3).
Recognition
Session 1
In the memory task, we first asked participants whether they had already interacted with 
each of 40 partners (20 old, 20 new ones). Participants recognized the 20 old partners accurately 
(Mhit  rate = 99.1%,  SD = 2.5,  Mdn = 100,  Mo = 100) and showed low false alarm rates (false 
alarms / [false alarms + correct rejections]; Mfalse alarm rate = 0.6%, SD = 1.7, Mdn = 0, Mo = 0; d` = 
3.8)—they distinguished between old and new partners quite well.
45
Session 2
In the second session, participants showed high accuracy (Mhit rate = 98.3%, SD = 5.1, Mdn 
= 100, Mo = 100) and low false alarm rates (Mfalse alarm rate = 0.8%, SD = 3.7, Mdn = 0, Mo = 0; d` 
= 3.6), suggesting excellent recognition even after a one-week retention interval.
Cooperativeness evaluation
The second question of the memory task evaluated the cooperativeness of partners on a 
scale from 0 (no cooperative actions) to 100 (always cooperative). Overall, defector partners 
among the old partners received low cooperativeness values and cooperator partners received 
high cooperativeness values in both sessions, matching the strategies of the partner types (Figure 
2.4). The larger variability for cooperator partners in each session reflects the reactivity of the 
Tit-For-Tat strategy to the participants’ behaviour (cooperator partners’ Mcooperation rate = 57.2%, SD 
= 19.9, Mdn = 55, Mo = 50).
Figure 2.4. Cooperativeness evaluations of defector and cooperator partners. Boxplots represent 
cooperativeness evaluations of the partner types among old partners for both sessions. Boxplots 
show the median as a line inside the box, which contains 50% of the data (upper border = 75th 
percentile, lower border = 25th percentile). The triangle represents the mean. The whiskers range 
from 5 to 95% of the data, outliers are represented as diamonds. We additionally excluded the 





We  analysed  the  results  of  the  memory  task  as  the  accuracy  of  categorization  in 
conjunction  with  correct  recognition  of  old  partners.  This  accuracy rate,  however,  must  be 
corrected for the chance level of accuracy reached by participants’ guessing the answers. To 
represent the chance level, we considered the perceived proportion of defectors and cooperators 
among all partners, whether old or new, recognized as old. To correct for chance performance, 
we  present  the  simple  difference  between  accuracy rate  and  chance  level,  averaged  across 
participants.
We found that,  on average,  defectors  were remembered better  than cooperators  in  the 
defectors-rare  condition  (h =  0.80),  cooperators  remembered  better  than  defectors  in  the 
cooperators-rare condition (h = 0.80), and both partner types were remembered equally well in 
the  equal-proportion  condition  (Figure  2.5).  This  matches  the  predictions  of  the  rarity 
hypothesis. Analysing the data at the individual’s level showed that this pattern held for most of 
the participants: 89% of participants in the defectors-rare condition remembered defectors better 
than  they  remembered  cooperators,  93%  in  the  cooperators-rare  condition  remembered 
cooperators better than they remembered defectors, and 84% in the equal-proportion condition 
remembered both partner types equally well.
Figure 2.5. Accuracy rates for defector and cooperator partners. For the depicted accuracy rates, 
we calculated categorization accuracy in conjunction with correct recognition of old partners per 
participant, subtracted individual chance levels (i.e., the perceived proportion of partner types 
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among old and new partners recognized as old), and averaged across participants. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Session 2
Correcting the accuracy rate for the chance level per person in Session 2 resulted,  on 
average, in defectors being remembered better than cooperators when defectors were rare (h = 
0.75), cooperators remembered better than defectors when cooperators were rare (h = 0.80), and 
both partner types remembered equally well when they were equally common (Figure 2.5). This 
was true for most participants: 92% in the defectors-rare condition remembered defectors better 
than  they  remembered  cooperators,  93%  in  the  cooperators-rare  condition  remembered 
cooperators better than they remembered defectors, and 77% in the equal-proportion condition 
remembered both partner types equally well. Again in Session 2, the accuracy rate corrected for 
the chance level supported the predictions of the rarity hypothesis. Across sessions, the accuracy 
corrected for chance slightly decreased for cooperator and defector partners in all conditions.
Discussion
To explore whether people better remember cheaters or the rare partner type, we varied the 
proportion of defectors and cooperators (represented by Tit-For-Tat partners) in the interaction 
group in a between-subjects design and tested whether a cheater-memory or a rarity strategy 
matched the accuracy rates of partner categorization in conjunction with correct recognition 
better. Accounting for the perceived proportion of partner types in each condition, in the short 
(after 10 min) and long run (after 1 week), participants remembered the rare partner type in the 
interaction group better than they remembered the common one. This pattern of results matches 
the predictions of the rarity hypothesis.
Our study extends the work on the rarity strategy in cooperation (Barclay, 2008, Bell et al., 
2010) by addressing two issues: the role of experience and long-term memory retention.
Does experience influence categorization?
Rather  than  reading  about  their  partners’ behaviour,  our  participants  experienced  the 
partner types in repeated interactions. This way, they could form their own impressions, were 
personally involved by receiving the payoffs from these interactions, and had the opportunity to 
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establish reciprocal relationships in a more ecologically valid situation. Cooperation with the 
cooperators increased over the course of 10 repetitions (Figure 2.3), confirming that participants 
require the repeated interactions to become acquainted with the partner types. This resulted in 
high recognition and categorization rates (even after a week). The recognition rates we observed 
are higher than those in previous studies on partner-type memory by 13–65% (Appendix Table 
B1). Compared to other studies collecting categorization accuracy in conjunction with correct 
recognition of old partners (Barclay, personal communication; Chiappe et al., 2004, Farrelly & 
Turnbull, 2009), our conjunction-categorization rates exceed the rates of these studies by 8–68% 
(Table B1). Some studies reported categorization accuracy of old partners independent of correct 
recognition  (e.g.,  Barclay,  2008).  If  we  calculate  this  independent  categorization  accuracy 
(Appendix Figure B1), our rates differ by -11–50% (Table B1). Remembering the moves from 
repeated interactions with partners whose strategies react to one’s own behaviour seems to be a 
difficult task—more difficult than remembering one move per partner as in the previous studies. 
Nevertheless, repetition pays off by allowing a stronger encoding of partners and an accurate 
summary of their behaviour. The assignment of types allows individuals to ignore occasional 
defections of cooperator partners, for example, as long as the cooperator partners, in general, 
cooperate. This robustness towards variance in the partner’s behaviour also applies to memory 
errors,  which  makes  the  assignment  of  types  a  good  strategy  with  high  memory  load.  To 
accurately categorize partners, it seems, repeated interactions are an important component.
How robust are the memory strategies to longer retention intervals?
Barclay (2008) and Bell et al. (2010) found support for the rarity strategy in a memory test 
minutes after the presentation of the partners. We confirmed this finding and replicated the result 
in a memory test 1 week after the initial presentation. So, despite this long retention interval, 
participants  performed  similarly  in  the  first  and  second  session  in  correctly  recognizing 
previously seen partners and categorizing defectors and cooperators. This is consistent with the 
idea that categorizing partners into types is a stable criterion that lasts longer than an immediate 
repeated encounter. Though accuracy levels decreased slightly across the sessions, this did not 
seem  to  interfere  with  the  rarity  strategy—approximately  the  same  number  of  participants 
showed a preferential memory for the rare partner type in the first and second session. This 
means that the relation between categorization rates (in conjunction with correct recognition) 
and chance levels used to correct these rates must be similar. As the chance levels represent 
participants’ perception of the proportion of partner types, one can conclude that not only is 
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participants’ memory for partner types robust to longer retention intervals but also their memory 
for  the  environment.  Compared  to  other  studies  collecting  categorization  accuracy  in 
conjunction with correct recognition of old partners, our conjunction-categorization rates from 
the second session after 1 week exceed the rates from studies with retention interval of several 
minutes by 10–47% (Table B1). Some studies reported categorization accuracy of old partners 
independent  of  correct  recognition  (e.g.,  Barclay,  2008).  If  we  calculate  this  independent 
categorization accuracy (Figure B1), our rates from 1 week retention differ from the study with 
several minutes retention by -8–37% (Table B1). So, our results from the long retention interval 
of  1  week  even  mostly  exceed  those  results  from  studies  with  several  minutes  retention, 
emphasizing  the  unusual  robustness  of  our  categorization  results.  Moreover,  participants 
benefited from their experience with and improved knowledge of the partner types, indicated by 
a comparable proportion of cooperation with cooperators in the beginning of the second session 
as in the end of the first session (Figure 2.3). These findings speak to the importance of memory 
as one of the prerequisites for establishing long-lasting social interactions via reciprocity and 
promoting the emergence of cooperation.
Alternative analytical methods
Additionally to addressing the two questions mentioned above, our study, compared to 
previous ones, employed a different analytical method. Would we still find a rarity effect if we 
analysed the data with previously used methods (Appendix Document B3)? 
Compared to Barclay  (2008), our method differs in three aspects—the accuracy rates to 
test the hypotheses on, the chance level for which to account the accuracy rates, and the way 
how to account for the chance level. First, whereas Barclay investigated the cheater-memory and 
rarity strategy in the categorization accuracy independent of correct recognition, we calculated 
the categorization accuracy in conjunction with correct recognition of old partners, because we 
consider this a necessary requirement for partner categorization in everyday life. So, as opposed 
to Barclay, our accuracy rates do not contain categorizations of old partners falsely recognized 
to be new. Second, that is why, for chance level, we did not take into account the perceived 
proportion of partner types among old and new partners, like Barclay did, but the perceived 
proportion  among  old  and  new  partners  recognized  as  old.  Third,  Barclay  calculated  the 
difference between accuracy rate and chance level relative to the individual chance levels using 
[(accuracy - chance level) / chance level], but this relative correction biases the difference score 
in favour of the rare type, increasing the probability of finding a rarity effect. We subtracted the 
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individual chance levels from the accuracy rates to yield a less biased measure. So, our method 
constitutes categorization accuracy in conjunction with correct recognition of old partners, a 
chance  level  of  the  perceived  proportion  of  partner  types  among  old  and  new  partners 
recognized as old, and the correction for chance performance by taking the simple difference 
between accuracy and chance level. Barclay’s method constitutes categorization accuracy for 
old partners independent of correct recognition, the perceived proportion of partner types among 
old and new partners, and the correction for chance by taking a relative difference. Regardless of 
the method applied, though, our data always produce a rarity effect (Figure B1).
Bell et al.  (2010) analysed their data with the aid of multinomial processing tree (MPT) 
models.  This  method  distinguishes  recognition,  categorization,  and  various  guessing  biases 
(Batchelder & Riefer, 1990). Employing a model by Bayen, Murnane, and Erdfelder  (1996), 
Bell et al. (2010) found a rarity effect also in a reanalysis of Barclay’s (2008) data. Though we 
attempted  an  analysis  with  our  data,  we  could  not  apply  the  MPT method.  One  guessing 
assumption MPT models incorporate is the categorization of new partners falsely recognized as 
old, but participants in our study discriminated old from new partners so accurately that we only 
had few data points for this category in all conditions and sessions. With scarce data for this 
guessing assumption, the MPT model could not produce precise estimates for our categorization 
parameters.  Although  scarce  data  distort  the  analysis  with  MPT  models,  this  is  not  a 
disadvantage of the study. We believe our participants discriminated old from new partners so 
well,  because  they were acquainted with them through the  repeated interactions.  This  large 
amount of experience offers a more realistic situation compared to meeting the partner once, like 
in a one-shot game. Therefore, the proportion of new partners falsely recognized as old, alone, 
may not be an appropriate guessing assumption for data with high recognition.
Limitations
The design  of  our  study is  limited  in  some ways  that  could  potentially influence  the 
results. First, rather than cooperating unconditionally, our cooperator partners played Tit-For-Tat 
and, therefore, were not as easily identifiable as cooperators. Frequently defecting participants 
did not experience much cooperation by cooperator partners and might not realize that these 
partners  are  cooperators,  reflected by the  large variability of  cooperativeness  evaluations  of 
cooperator partners (Figure 2.4). Experiencing cooperator partners as cooperative, however, is 
crucial for categorizing them correctly and can otherwise decrease categorization accuracy. The 
alternative, implementing unconditionally cooperating partners, could have resulted in greater 
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disadvantages. Participants might defect with these pure cooperators, because there are no costs 
of exploiting them. In effect, participants would lose the motivation to track partner types which 
potentially would have decreased categorization accuracy.
Second,  whereas  letting  participants  take  part  in  a  game  increases  commitment,  a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game offers only a limited model of cooperative interactions outside the 
lab. This limits the generalizability of our results. First, according to the definition by Cartwright 
(2000,  p.  86),  reciprocal  altruism  is  time-delayed  mutualism—donor  and  recipient  of 
cooperative acts alternate in their roles so that there passes a certain amount of time between the 
tit and the tat. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma we used, however, the exchange of actions happened 
simultaneously so that a participant was donor and recipient at the same time. Thus, using a 
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma that enables the alternation of the roles might have modelled the 
situation  we actually wanted  to  investigate  more closely (Frean,  1994,  Nowak & Sigmund, 
1994).  Second,  the  setup  of  the  game  has  to  be  chosen  with  care:  The  payoff  matrix  can 
influence the behaviour of participants (Furlong & Opfer, 2009), and using computer instead of 
human partners affects participants as well (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003).
Conclusion
Our  study  confirms  evidence  of  a  general  strategy  to  remember  the  rare  interaction 
partners—also  in  repeated  encounters,  over  a  long  retention  interval,  and  regardless  of  the 
analytical method applied. We reject the cheater-memory hypothesis: In this study, cheaters are 
not remembered preferentially regardless of the environment. Given that the rarity and cheater-
memory hypotheses make the same predictions when defectors in the interaction group are rare, 
the cheater-memory strategy could be the implementation of the rarity strategy in this kind of 
environment,  though. Contrary to always remembering the same partner type (i.e.,  cheaters) 
regardless of the environment, however, the strategy seems to be to remember the type that is 
rare  in  the  respective  environment.  Our  findings,  thereby,  support  the  idea  of  a  cognitive 
architecture  that  flexibly  responds  to  the  environment  instead  of  specializing  in  certain 
interaction  groups.  By  applying  the  toolbox  metaphor  of  the  “fast  and  frugal  heuristics” 
programme  (Gigerenzer, Todd & The ABC Research Group, 1999), our findings suggest that 
rather  than  using  the  same  tool  (i.e.,  remember  the  same  partner  type)  in  all  possible 
environments, participants responded in an ecologically rational way by remembering partner 
types differentially depending on the environment (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007).
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Moreover, our results have implications for the design of new strategies to explain the 
emergence  of  cooperation.  The  traditional  reciprocal  strategies  such  as  Tit-For-Tat  require 
remembering the partners’ single last action and do not distinguish in memory accuracy between 
defection or cooperation behaviour. Stevens et al. (2011) showed that, when asked to remember 
the single last action, individuals do not preferentially remember cooperation or defection. Our 
results,  on the other  hand,  indicate  that  memory can differentiate  between the behaviour  in 
partner types. The combination of these findings leads the way to more realistic strategies that 
store  partner  types  instead  of  single  actions  and  distinguish  in  memory  accuracy  between 
defectors and cooperators depending on the environment. Research on indirect reciprocity has 
already produced strategies acting on the partner’s reputation as acquired in the interactions with 
third parties (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001, Roberts, 2008). In evolutionary simulations, these 
strategies outcompeted their opponents and promoted the evolution of cooperation.
In sum, repeatedly meeting interaction partners seems to improve partner-type memory, as 
we  found  higher  recognition  and  categorization  (dependent  and  independent  of  correct 
recognition) rates compared to previous studies. This strong encoding of partner types could 
explain the high accuracy rates and the robustness of the memory strategy even after a retention 
interval  of  1  week.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  rarity  of  defectors  and  cooperators  in  the 
environment  influences  how well  they are  remembered.  It  looks as  if  people  indeed try to 
minimize costs—not the costs associated with exploitation, as suggested by the cheater-memory 
hypothesis,  but  the  costs  associated  with  memory  errors.  Of  two  people  with  whom  you 
interacted,  the  cheater  might  be  the  more  important  partner  type  to  remember,  but  in  an 
environment  where  cheaters  represent  the  majority,  the  costs  for  remembering  all  of  them 
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Abstract
In this project, we are looking for strategies to explain the emergence of cooperation that 
are robust to noise (i.e., memory or perception/decision errors). Tit-For-Tat, the most prominent 
example of 1-step memory strategies, is not robust to noise, because even little noise decreases 
its success. Noise is quite common in everyday life, though. The strategies’ concept of a 1-step 
memory is a too-narrow basis to successfully cope with noise. That is why authors proposed 
strategies that rely on a larger part of the common history between player and partner. This is a 
more stable criterion on which to base the decision, because, for example, occasional defections 
from a generally “good” partner do not lead to immediate retaliation. Yet an alternative are non-
contingent strategies that do not act upon their partners’ behaviour and are thus not susceptible 
to noise. We test the three strategy groups competitively regarding their robustness to noise, 
allowing for a vast array of strategies and stochasticity.
We, first, hypothesize that impression-based strategies are more robust to noise than 1-step 
memory strategies in maintaining cooperation. To avoid the bias of a strategy set chosen by the 
experimenter,  we let  strategies  evolve  in  a  genetic  algorithm simulation.  Complemented  by 
mutation and crossing over, successful strategies survive and spread, whereas unsuccessful ones 
vanish.  The  simulation  supports  the  hypothesis.  Most  robust  to  noise  were  non-contingent 
strategies, though.
Second, we hypothesize that impression-based strategies better predict human behaviour 
than 1-step memory strategies. We cross-validated the strategies on participants’ behaviour and 
confirmed the hypothesis. Again, non-contingent strategies were most successful in predicting 
participants’ behaviour. 
The results suggest that non-contingent strategies are more successful in the simulation 
and better predict participants’ behaviour than contingent strategies. This implies that humans 
pursue even simpler strategies than impression-based and 1-step memory strategies.
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Introduction 
Which strategies do people pursue that help emerge and maintain cooperation? One of the 
first attempts to answer this question was Axelrod’s  (1980a) famous tournament in which he 
pitted different strategies against each other and compared their success in playing the Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. There, a player and his partner can either cooperate or defect and 
receive  payoff  depending  on  both  choices.  Whereas  defection  yields  more  payoff  for  each 
individual, mutual cooperation is the best result for both opponents. To qualify as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, the payoffs have to adhere to the size order: one-sided defection > mutual cooperation 
> mutual defection > one-sided cooperation. Additionally, alternating defection and cooperation 
must not exceed the averaged payoff from mutual cooperation.
In  Axelrod’s  (1980a) tournament,  Tit-For-Tat  (TFT)  won,  a  strategy  that  begins  by 
cooperating  and  then  reciprocates  the  partner’s  previous  move.  TFT  also  won  a  second 
tournament, an evolutionary simulation (Axelrod, 1980b), and a genetic algorithm simulation by 
Axelrod (1987). Soon, this strategy became well-known, not at least because of its simple and 
comprehensible  eye-for-an-eye  style.  It  was  difficult,  though,  finding  evidence  for  the 
implementation of TFT in non-human animals (Milinski, 1987 and Dugatkin, 1991, but Lazarus 
& Metcalfe, 1990, Masters & Waite, 1990, Reboreda & Kacelnik, 1990, and Stephens, Anderson 
& Benson, 1997; Lombardo, 1985, but König, 1988 and Lombardo, 1990) or humans. Oskamp’s 
(1971) review of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma results reports three studies showing that, when 
participants played the game against each other, the cooperation rate was lower compared to that 
of TFT. Wilson (1971) and Opp (1988) confirmed this finding. As reported by Erev and Roth 
(1998), even Anatol Rapoport, who proposed TFT in Axelrod’s (1980a, 1980b) tournaments, did 
not  find  evidence  that  his  participants  used  TFT.  Also  with  Wedekind  and  Milinski  (1996, 
Milinski  &  Wedekind,  1998)  the  majority  of  participants  pursued  a  more  non-cooperative 
strategy.
One  reason  for  this  discrepancy  between  theory  and  practice  was  that  authors  had 
neglected TFT’s susceptibility to noise (see  Axelrod, 1984, on the effects of noise on TFT’s 
success). We will use the term noise to refer to memory errors (i.e., a player cannot remember 
what his partner did; as in Milinski & Wedekind, 1998, Stevens et al., 2011) and perception or 
decision errors (i.e., a player misinterprets his partner’s actions or, for some reason, does not 
respond in  the  corresponding fashion;  as  in  Boyd,  1989,  Nowak & Sigmund,  1993,  Wu & 
Axelrod, 1995). A single error between two TFT players results in alternating defections, largely 
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decreasing their  success.  Besides studies with stable noise levels (Donninger,  1986,  Bendor, 
Kramer & Stout, 1991, Lindgren, 1991), analytical derivations (Molander, 1985, Bendor, 1987, 
1993,  Müller,  1987) and studies with varying noise levels (Wu & Axelrod, 1995,  Lomborg, 
1996, Stevens et al., 2011) proved that TFT is not robust to noise. Because people are prone to 
memory, perception, or decision errors, TFT cannot be deemed a realistic candidate to explain 
human behaviour.
Proposals for noise-robust strategies
Authors made different proposals which strategies work best in a noisy environment. In 
Nowak and Sigmund’s  (1993) simulations, Win-Stay, Lose-Shift won (to not confuse it with 
another  strategy,  we  will  refer  to  it  as  Win-Stay,  Lose-Change,  WSLC,  as  did  Messick  & 
Liebrand, 1995). WSLC reciprocates cooperation only if both, player and partner, cooperated on 
the previous move (and defects if either of them defected). On the other hand, it cooperates after 
mutual defection to offer a way back to cooperation. In other simulations, WSLC was not as 
successful (Wu & Axelrod, 1995, Stevens et al., 2011). Although having never won analytical 
derivations  or  simulations,  Grim  Trigger  (Grim)  is  deemed  a  good  strategy  to  establish 
cooperation in the presence of non-cooperative strategies (Müller, 1987,  Nowak & Sigmund, 
1993).  With  Grim,  a  player  cooperates  as  long  as  the  partner  cooperates  and  defects 
indiscriminately after the partner’s defection. Another strategy proposed for noisy environments 
is TFT with occasional unconditional cooperation (called “generous”). Generous TFT proved to 
be superior to TFT what concerns robustness to noise (Molander, 1985,  Bendor et al., 1991, 
Nowak & Sigmund, 1992,  Wu & Axelrod, 1995). That seems to be true only up to a certain 
degree of noise, though. In Stevens et al.’s (2011) simulations with a broader range of noise, all 
variants  of  TFT  and  also  other  promising  strategies  without  stochasticity  (WSLC,  Grim) 
vanished, and cooperation went extinct.
The strategies, we have mentioned so far, have in common a 1-step memory. We believe 
this is a too-narrow basis to successfully cope with noise. Stevens et al.  (2011) showed that 
participants made mistakes when asked to recall their partners’ single last move. At the error rate 
they found, cooperation in an evolutionary simulation vanished. For more robustness to noise, 
authors proposed strategies that rely on a larger part of the common history between player and 
partner. Bendor  (1987), for example, explained the advantage of long-term memory strategies 
especially in  a  noisy environment  by pointing out  the resistance to  outliers  from behaviour 
shown so far: “In a sense, that history creates a fund of goodwill or trust that is not obliterated 
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by one bad encounter.  Conversely,  of course,  one good episode will  not overwhelm a long 
memory of  bad  times”.  Being better  equipped against  noise,  we hypothesize  that  strategies 
relying on more information from the history with the partner are not only more robust to noise 
than 1-step memory strategies but also model human behaviour more closely.
Another way to be robust to noise is not to rely on noise-susceptible information. Non-
contingent  strategies  do  not  base  their  decision  on  their  partners’ behaviour  but  determine 
whether to cooperate on each move with a certain probability (e.g., AllD defects on each move). 
Although this is an intriguing method against noise, it contradicts the idea of reciprocity as one 
of the mechanisms proposed for the emergence of cooperation in humans (Trivers. 1971).
When Axelrod (1984) wanted to find the best strategy for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
he  realized  that  there  is  no  single  best  strategy  independent  of  the  environment  (i.e.,  the 
competing strategies). This explains why the strategies proposed as noise-robust alternatives to 
TFT were successful in some studies and not successful in others. Only in an environment with 
as  many  competitors  as  possible  are  noise-robustness  results  reliable.  One-step  memory 
strategies  and non-contingent  strategies  have  been  tested  against  each  other  regarding their 
robustness to noise (e.g.,  Nowak & Sigmund, 1992). Strategies relying on more information 
from the history with the partner have been tested separately on their robustness to noise (e.g., 
Nowak  &  Sigmund,  1998).  There  have  been  studies  testing  the  three  strategy  groups 
competitively under noise but only with a limited set of strategies (e.g., Anh et al., 2011) or not 
allowing for stochasticity in the strategies (Lindgren, 1991, Miller, 1996). Here, we test the three 
strategy  groups  competitively  under  noise,  allowing  for  a  vast  array  of  strategies  and 
stochasticity. To avoid the bias of a strategy set chosen by the experimenter, we used a genetic 
algorithm as the method to competitively test all three strategy groups. 
Testing strategies’ robustness to noise
One  way  of  building  an  environment  as  diverse  as  possible  without  having  the 
experimenter choose the set of strategies is with a genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975). A genetic 
algorithm is a search method for a multidimensional space. The space consists of a string of 
features representing, in this case, various strategies. Applying crossover and mutation allows 
for strategies to adapt; letting successful strategies grow in their number of members and less 
successful ones cease results in the evolution of the most successful strategy. Since Axelrod 
(1987), some studies using genetic algorithms in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma did not deviate 
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from the fixed memory size of the original (Marks & Schnabl,  1999,  Golbeck, 2002,  Dyer, 
2004). Other studies let strategies with different memory length evolve but did not include noise 
(Crowley, Provencher, Sloane, Dugatkin, Spohn, Rogers & Alfieri, 1996, Scali, 2006, Brunauer, 
Löcker, Mayer, Mitterlechner & Payer, 2007). Lindgren  (1991) and Miller  (1996) represented 
strategies by a genetic algorithm/finite automata with variable memory size and let them evolve 
in a simulation with noise. Their design did not allow stochastic strategies to evolve, though. We 
designed  a  genetic  algorithm  with  variable  memory  size  able  to  represent  1-step  memory 
strategies, strategies relying on more information from the partner’s past, and non-contingent 
strategies. Moreover, it allows for stochasticity. We ran this genetic algorithm in an evolutionary 
simulation with increasing noise.
Impression-based strategies 
For  strategies  relying  on  more  information  from  the  partner’s  past,  we  designed 
impression-based  strategies.  These  strategies  determine  an  impression  of  the  partner  and 
cooperate as long as the impression is “good” and defect if the impression is “bad”. A player  
determines his partner’s impression by updating an impression index. This impression index is 
based on the outcome of the past interaction (i.e., the own move and the partner’s move) to 
which the player assigns a certain weight. Refining the above statement, the player cooperates if 
the impression index is positive and defects if it is negative.
There have been ideas for how the updating of such an index may proceed. In the areas of 
person cognition, and attitude theory and attribution, Gollob, Rossman, and Abelson (1973), for 
example, reported an additive model of social inference. This model holds that one can infer a 
person’s attitude towards one issue by summing his attitudes towards a related issue. Anderson 
and Birnbaum (1976), however, refuted the additive model with its assumption of independent 
value and number of instances in favour of an averaging model. Although averaging here rather 
refers to a weighted serial integration process.
In studies concerning the emergence of cooperation, the idea of adding 1 if the partner 
cooperates and subtracting 1 if he defects was used in the image scoring literature (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998,  Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001,  Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009). There, the 
focal person has to remember information on how the partner behaved in interactions with third 
parties, which is an additional source for noise. Intention recognizers in Anh et al.’ (2011) model 
use a Bayesian network to assess their partners’ intention, but the conditional probability of the 
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past  observations  given  the  intention  is  based  on  a  simple  subtraction  of  defective  from 
cooperative moves which is then normalized. Whether image scoring or intention recognition, 
adding or subtracting 1 neglects the dimensions different acts of defection and cooperation can 
take. Wakano and Yamamura  (2001) reported a learning strategy that acts on an internal state 
and updates this state based on the interactions: It reinforces cooperation or defection when the 
payoff from the interaction exceeds an aspiration level and negatively reinforces the behaviour 
when the payoff undercuts the level.
Among the strategies  Bendor  (1987) analysed in  an  Iterated Prisoner’s  Dilemma with 
noise was a weighted average strategy (again, rather a weighted serial integration) with variable 
memory. Erev and Roth (2002) and Hruschka and Henrich (2006) reported strategies which used 
an index, either to reinforce a certain strategy from a set of strategies or to decide about the 
preference of partners for future interactions. Both models updated the index by averaging with 
a weighted payoff from the current move. Alonso-Sanz and Martin  (2006) showed that in a 
simulation with a spatial setup a strategy averaging over three past steps boosted cooperation. 
Based  on  previous  research,  we  implemented  an  “Adding”  and  an  “Averaging” 
impression-based  family.  Adding  sums  weights  assigned  to  the  moves  to  determine  an 
impression  index.  Averaging  builds  the  average  of  a  certain  window  of  past  weights. 
Additionally,  we  implemented  a  “contradictory  Adding”  (ConAdding)  and  a  “contradictory 
Averaging” (ConAveraging) strategy family. In contrast to the “regular” forms which take all of 
the partners’ moves into account to determine an impression index, the contradictory variants 
only consider the moves that contradict the current impression. In line with reciprocity, these 
strategies  do  not  update  a  positive  impression  index,  for  example,  as  long  as  the  partner 
continues to cooperate but only take defective moves into account, in this case, to reciprocate 
defection immediately.  Thus, contradictory strategies are more provocable and less forgiving 
than regular strategies.
With  Adding (and ConAdding),  a  person arrives  at  an  impression  by storing a  single 
updated impression index, the sum of all  moves’ weights.  Directly after the interaction,  the 
player adds to this sum the present move’s weight so that he has to keep in mind just the single 
updated  impression  index.  Anderson  (1996) described  the  integration  of  adjectives  into  a 
judgement of a person and pinpoints what we mean by impression formation via Adding—if one 
replaces “adjective” by “move of the partner”:
As each successive adjective is  given,  the subject evaluates  it  and integrates this 
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valuation into the accumulative judgement memory of the person. Once its meaning 
has been extracted and integrated, the adjective itself is no longer necessary. It may 
be  stored  separately  or  forgotten.  The  main  functional  memory is  the  integrated 
memory about the person. (p. 366)
With  Averaging (and ConAveraging),  a  person stores  the  moves’ weights  in  a  certain 
memory window and acts on the average of them. If memory for the previous move (cooperate 
[C] or defect [D]) is error prone, as in Stevens et al.’s (2011) experiment, one might argue it will 
be even more error-prone for moves before the previous one. Still, an average of several noisy 
moves  might  be  a  better  basis  for  an  appropriate  reaction  than  a  single  last  noisy  move. 
Impression-based strategies act on a negative/positive scale, and even if a player erroneously 
remembered  or  perceived  some  negative  weights  along  with  the  positive  weights  from 
interactions with a cooperator, chances are the average will still be positive so that the player 
cooperates. On the other hand, a strategy acting on the partner’s previous move defects with a 
cooperator if the player erroneously remembered or perceived a cooperator to have defected. 
Moreover,  people  might  be  bad  in  remembering  the  exact  outcomes  of  the  individual 
interactions—and therefore 1-step memory strategies ask them to do something they do not do 
in reality—because that is not how memory works in everyday life. Instead, they might be able 
to process the outcomes and arrive at an average/impression that represents the partner’s type 
quite accurately. In perception research, participants estimated the mean size of symbols more 
accurately than the size of the individual symbols (Ariely,  2001,  Chong & Treisman, 2005). 
Studies  in  the  judgement/impression  formation  literature  showed  that  the  processing  of 
adjectives or behaviour is independent of memory (Anderson & Hubert, 1963, Dreben, Fiske & 
Hastie, 1979). Whereas memory for individual adjectives changed after a distraction task, the 
judgement remained the same (Riskey, 1979). 
So, the impression index is a more stable criterion compared to just the single last action, 
because noise does not necessarily result in inappropriate reactions: Occasional defections from 
a  generally  “good” partner  do not  lead  to  immediate  retaliation  and occasional  cooperative 
moves from a generally “bad” partner do not lead to immediate forgiving.
In sum, we hypothesize that 
1.  Impression-based  strategies  are  more  robust  to  noise  than  1-step  memory  strategies  in 
maintaining cooperation and surviving in an evolutionary simulation. 
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2. Impression-based strategies better predict human behaviour than 1-step memory strategies. 
We tested three strategy groups, 1-step memory (e.g., TFT, WSLC, Grim), impression-
based  (Adding,  Averaging,  ConAdding,  ConAveraging),  and  non-contingent  strategies  (e.g., 
AllD), competitively under noise. To assess whether impression-based strategies are more robust 
to noise than 1-step memory strategies,  we ran a genetic algorithm simulation with varying 
noise. To evaluate whether impression-based strategies better predict human behaviour than 1-
step memory strategies, we cross-validated strategies from all three groups on behavioural data 
from a previous project (Volstorf et al., 2011).
Methods
Functionality of impression-based strategies
The main idea of impression-based strategies is to act on an impression of the partner. The 
impression is represented by an impression index that refers to a specific value along a negative-
positive scale. Positive impression indices represent a “good” impression, negative impression 
indices represent a “bad” impression. The initial impression of a partner is indifferent (0). After 
a player has interacted with his partner, he updates the impression index of the partner in a first 
step and, second, acts on it  in their  next interaction.  The decision rule is:  “cooperate if  the 
impression index is positive, defect if the impression index is negative”. A player, for example, 
that has updated the partner’s impression index to be 2 after their first interaction has a “good” 
impression of the partner and will cooperate in their next interaction. A player that has updated 
the impression index to be -4 has a “bad” impression and will defect in their next interaction. We 
call the values to update an impression index “weights”. One can think of them as the player’s 
evaluation of an interaction’s outcome.
Besides  the  regular  forms—Adding  which  sums  the  weights  and  Averaging  which 
averages the weights of a certain window of past interactions—we distinguish a contradictory 
Adding and a contradictory Averaging family. Contradictory forms just consider the weights of 
moves that contradict the current impression. Imagine, the weight for mutual cooperation is 2, 
and  the  weight  for  unilateral  defection  by  the  partner  is  -3.  With  Adding,  a  player  who 
cooperated with his partner for five times has an impression index of (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 =) 10 
(Averaging with  window size  3:  (2  + 2 + 2)  /  3  = 2).  If  the partner  defected in  the sixth  
interaction, the impression index will be (10 + [-3] =) 7 (Averaging: (2 + 2 + [-3]) / 3 = 0.33),  
and the player will continue to cooperate. With ConAdding, a player who cooperated with his 
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partner for five times has an impression index of (2 =) 2 (ConAveraging with window size 3: 2 / 
1 = 2). If the partner defected in the sixth interaction, the impression index will be (2 + [-3] =) -1 
(ConAveraging: (2 + [-3]) / 2 = -0.5), and the player will defect. If the defection by the partner 
was intended, contradictory strategies will not let him get away with it, whereas Adding and 
Averaging risk being exploited. If the defection was due to noise, Adding and Averaging will  
overlook  it  and  move  on,  whereas  contradictory  strategies  risk  decreasing  payoff  through 
needless defections.
The chromosome
We ran a simulation in which agents meet to play the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 
Payoff for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Player’s Choice Partner’s Choice
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 3 ; 3 0 ; 5
Defect 5 ; 0 1 ; 1
Note. Payoff on the left in each cell is paid to the player, on the right to the partner.
We did not distribute certain strategies among the agents, however, but equipped each 
agent  with  features  that,  in  combination,  result  in  a  strategy and  of  which  parameters  are 
determined randomly at the beginning of the simulation.  This kind of simulation is called a 
genetic algorithm and the features, following the biological metaphor, are called genes. There 
were eight genes in a chromosome that determined an agent’s strategy (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1. Genes in the chromosome and their meaning. Gene “ind” gives the probability to 
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cooperate whenever the player is indifferent, that is, whenever the impression index is 0. Genes 
“cc”, “cd”, “dc”, and “dd” refer to the weight put on what player and partner did on the previous 
move.  Genes “ada”  (0 = adding,  1  = averaging)  and “rec” (0 = regular,  1 = contradictory) 
determine how a strategy updates an impression index. Gene “ws” gives the window size of past 
interactions for strategies with ada = 1.
The first gene (“ind”) codes the probability of cooperating if the impression is indifferent
—that is, on the first move between a player and his partner and every time the impression index 
becomes 0 again. The next four genes represent the weights an agent applies to the situations of 
mutual cooperation (CC) in the previous interaction (gene “cc”), “player cooperated and partner 
defected”  (CD; gene “cd”),  “player  defected  and partner  cooperated” (DC; gene  “dc”),  and 
mutual defection (DD; gene “dd”). These weights range from -5 to +5. Gene “ada” determines 
whether the strategy adds (0) or averages (1); gene “rec” determines whether the strategy is of 
regular form (0) or a contradictory variant (1). So, genes ada and rec represent the membership 
of one of the four strategy families of impression-based strategies: Adding (ada = 0, rec = 0), 
Averaging (ada = 1, rec = 0), ConAdding (ada = 0, rec = 1), and ConAveraging (ada = 1, rec = 
1). Gene “ws” gives the window size an agent looks back in the history of the partner’s moves 
(i.e.,  weights)  with  him  and  ranges  from  0  to  9  (for  10  interactions).  Only 
Averaging/ConAveraging strategies make use of the window size. In the remaining section, we 
will  describe basic principles of defining strategies with the chromosome. For definitions of 
strategies, please consult Appendix Table C1.
The chromosome can also represent 1-step memory strategies like TFT, WSLC, or Grim, 
and  non-contingent  strategies  like  AllC  (always  cooperate),  AllD,  or  Random  (determine 
randomly whether to cooperate or defect). To model these strategies, the chromosome entails 
that also 1-step memory and non-contingent strategies are defined by impression-based features 
(genes ada, ws, rec) and build an impression index. Crucial, however, is not the genotype, the 
genetic  disposition,  but  the  phenotype,  the  shown behaviour.  If  all  weight  genes  are  0,  for 
example (“0–100, 0, 0, 0, 0, *, *, *”, where * means irrelevant), the impression index of the 
partner stays indifferent after each interaction. In this case, the strategy always goes by gene ind, 
and all  other  genes  are  irrelevant.  The same is  true  if  ada  = 1 (Averaging family)  and the 
window size is 0 (here, the weight genes can be ≠ 0: “0–100, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *”). This strategy 
does not build an impression index. Instead, gene ind determines with which probability the 
agent cooperates on every move. This enables categorizing non-contingent strategies. Assigning 
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the  probability  space  of  ind  from 0  to  100 to  strategies,  we distinguished  AllD (ind  =  0),  
Random (ind = 50), AllC (ind = 100), and four more strategies (e.g., C_1–25 with ind = 1–25 
cooperates in 1 to 25% of the cases). 
Non-contingent strategies are immune to noise—they do not take their partners’ behaviour 
as  a  basis  for  their  action,  so  they  cannot  implement  their  move  incorrectly  based  on  a 
misremembered or misperceived partner’s move. The “0–100, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *” chromosome is 
the only noise-robust category for  non-contingent  strategies,  because literally no impression 
index is built that could be misremembered, misperceived, or implemented incorrectly. All gene 
constellations, including those that build an impression index, have to be assigned to strategies, 
though, and non-contingent strategies that build an impression index are automatically noise-
prone. That is why we had to compromise and defined noise-prone non-contingent strategies 
(probCoop,  probExtremeAlternate,  probMoody,  probDef;  see  Table  C1).  Again,  building  an 
impression  index  with  non-contingent  strategies  is  an  artefact  of  the  chromosome;  these 
strategies phenotypically still qualify as non-contingent strategies. So, with the onset of noise, 
we introduced two changes: a) reduce the categorizations of each non-contingent strategy to the 
“0–100, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *”  chromosome so that it is independent of noise and still does what its  
name  promises  (AllC,  AllD,  Random,  C_-strategies),  b)  if  a)  is  not  possible,  subsume the 
categorizations under probabilistic non-contingent versions that are noise-prone. The latter was 
the case for nine non-contingent strategies, four C_1st-strategies (which cooperate on the first 
move with ind% and cooperate from then on), four D_1st-strategies (which cooperate on the 
first move with ind% and defect from then on), and ExtremeAlternate (which cooperates or 
defects on the first move and does the opposite of its first move from then on). These strategies, 
together with the noise-prone categorizations of the remaining non-contingent strategies, merge 
into  probabilistic  non-contingent  strategies  (all  C_1st-categorizations  and  one  AllC-
categorization  merge  into  probCoop,  ExtremeAlternate  merges  into  probExtremeAlternate, 
some  AllC-,  AllD-,  Random-,  C_-categorizations  merge  into  probMoody,  all  D_1st-
categorizations and one AllD-categorization merge into probDef).
We defined 1-step memory strategies (like TFT, WSLC, Grim) by ada = 1 with ws = 1, 
because these build an impression index by only considering the weight from the last encounter. 
Moreover, 1-step memory strategies can be described by rec = 1 (with ws = 2). Here, we made 
use of the “contradictory” feature: These strategies do not update the impression index if the 
partner continues to do what he has been doing. Thus, the impression index stays close to the 
threshold between the impressions and allows an immediate reaction to a contradictory move. 
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For a strategy’s index to, in fact, stay close to the threshold between impressions, we often 
applied additional rules, though. With the ada = 0, rec = 1 version of TFT, for example, the 
absolute value of gene cd has to be greater than gene cc so that a player, in fact, defects after 
CD. For the player to cooperate after DC, we set |cd| = dc.
We defined impression-based strategies by means of the various constellations of weight 
gene parameters  (Table 3.2).  The genotypic contrast  to 1-step memory strategies is  that  the 
impression index is built from more than the last encounter (with Averaging and ConAveraging 
from more than the last two encounters). Besides the 20 non-contingent strategies, this resulted 
in 12 subforms for each of the four impression-based strategy families (Adding, ConAdding, 
Averaging, ConAveraging) and three 1-step memory strategies (TFT, WSLC, Grim). To even out 
the  competition,  we  created  two  1-step  memory  strategies  out  of  every  impression-based 
subform: one strict form with either ind = 0 or ind = 100 and additional rules for the weight 
genes to assure the index staying close to the threshold (as with TFT, WSLC, Grim), and a 
probabilistic form with unrestricted gene ind and rules allowing to cooperate after cooperation 
or  defection  of  the  partner  with  a  certain  probability.  This  resulted  in  24  1-step  memory 
strategies. The impression-based subform we named with an “i” (for “impression-based”) at the 
beginning (e.g., iTFT) to differentiate it from the strict form.
Table 3.2 
Constellations of weight gene parameters and the respective strategies.
Weight gene parameters Strategies
cc > 0, cd > 0, dc > 0, dd > 0 probCoop‡
cc < 0, cd > 0, dc > 0, dd > 0 Apologizer, probApologizer, iApologizer†
cc > 0, cd < 0, dc > 0, dd > 0 Cooperator, probCooperator, iCooperator†
cc > 0, cd > 0, dc < 0, dd > 0 Temptation, probTemptation, iTemptation†
cc > 0, cd > 0, dc > 0, dd < 0 Shy, probShy, iShy†
cc < 0, cd < 0, dc > 0, dd > 0 ExtremeAlternate‡, probExtremeAlternate‡
cc < 0, cd > 0, dc < 0, dd > 0 AntiTFT, probAntiTFT, iAntiTFT†
cc < 0, cd > 0, dc > 0, dd < 0 WCLS, probWCLS, iUnilateral†
cc > 0, cd < 0, dc < 0, dd > 0 WSLC, probWSLC, iMutual†
cc > 0, cd < 0, dc > 0, dd < 0 TFT, probTFT, iTFT†
cc > 0, cd > 0, dc < 0, dd < 0 probMoody‡
cc < 0, cd < 0, dc < 0, dd > 0 Lurer, probLurer, iLurer†
cc < 0, cd < 0, dc > 0, dd < 0 GreedyTFT, probGreedyTFT, iGreedyTFT†
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cc < 0, cd > 0, dc < 0, dd < 0 Sucker, probSucker, iSucker†
cc > 0, cd < 0, dc < 0, dd < 0 Grim, probGrim, iGrim†
cc < 0, cd < 0, dc < 0, dd < 0 probDef‡
Note. For  simplicity,  we  only  display  gene  parameters  ≠  0.  For  the  cases  in  which  gene 
parameters can be = 0, please consult Table C1. WCLS = Win-Change, Lose-Stay. All strategies 
beginning  with  “i”  are  impression-based  strategies,  strategies  with  ‡  mark  non-contingent 
strategies, the remaining ones are 1-step memory strategies. † Subform with strategies of each of 
the  four  strategy  families  (Adding,  ConAdding,  Averaging,  ConAveraging),  e.g., 
iApologizer_Adding.
The simulation
At the beginning of each run,  the programme determined the parameters of the genes 
randomly. The population consisted of 20 agents, each with his own set of gene parameters. 
Running the simulation with 40 agents did not change the results but took considerably longer. 
In the first block of interactions, each agent played the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with 
everyone else. This procedure was repeated for 10 blocks, with a random order each time. This 
constituted a generation. Repeating the block for 20 times did not change the cooperation rates. 
We implemented  noise  as  the  standard  deviation  of  a  normal  distribution  around  the 
correct  impression  index  (with  ada  =  0)  or  weight  (with  ada  =  1).  That  is,  with  a  certain 
probability  the  agent  did  not  act  on  (i.e.,  remember,  perceive,  or  implement)  the  correct 
impression index/weight but neighbouring indices/weights within standard deviations from 0.1 
to 5.0 in units of 0.1 (Figure 3.2). The normal distribution equation f(x) = 1 / (σ √ (2π)) exp (-1/2 
((x - μ) / σ)²) gives the density curves for the different standard deviations. We calculated the 
probability for the corresponding x-axis values relative to the sum of all density parameters per 
curve. Standard deviation (SD) 0.4 marked the onset of noise, because the probability to act on 
the  correct  impression  index/weight  is  <  1  and  the  probability  to  act  on  impression 
indices/weights ± 1 from the correct index/weight is > 0. As the standard deviation of the normal 
distribution  around the  correct  impression  index/weight  increases,  the  probability  to  act  on 
neighbouring indices/weights as well as the number of possible indices/weights increases. At SD 
= 5, the probabilities to act on the correct or a neighbouring impression index/weight only differ 
minimally.
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At the end of a generation,  agents reproduced in relation to their  success to build the 
population for the next generation. So, successful strategies potentially grew in their number of 
members and less successful ones ceased. The programme determined a strategy’s success by, 
first, cumulating each agent’s payoff. Then, the programme summed the payoff of all agents and 
assigned each agent to his share of the sum using the roulette-wheel technique (e.g., if the first 
agent gained 1 point, the second agent gained 3, then the first agent is assigned to the number 1, 
the second is assigned to the numbers 2 to 4...; Mitchell, 1998). Third, the programme chose two 
“parent” agents by drawing random numbers between 0 and the overall sum and picking the 
assigned agents. With a probability of 70% (corresponds to a crossover rate of 0.7), each gene 
marked a  crossover  spot.  That  is,  the  two agents  switched  all  genes  in  their  chromosomes 
following the spot. The programme sequentially determined crossover spots for the first and 
second agent. Afterwards, with a mutation probability of 0.1% (mutation rate of 0.001), each 
gene from both agents increased or decreased its parameter by one unit within the corresponding 
range (e.g.,  0–100 in gene ind,  0/1 in gene ada). The two resulting “offspring” agents were 
placed  in  the  next  generation.  The  programme  repeated  this  survival  mechanism  “with 
replacement” until the population was complete. Neither a crossover rate of 0.4 nor a mutation 
rate of 0.005 changed the cooperation rates. One run of the simulation stopped when each agent 
had the same parameters for all genes, that is, when all agents in the population pursued the 
same strategy. This happened after an average of M = 78.2 ± 0.1 generations (± 95% confidence 
interval). We repeated the simulation for 10,000 runs.
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Figure  3.2.  Example  standard  deviations  of  the  normal  distribution  around  the  correct 
impression index (with ada = 0) or weight (with ada = 1), here: 5, used to represent noise in 
processing the impression index/weight. The y-axis gives the density from which we calculate 
the probability to act on the impression index/weight (see text).
The cross-validation
After the simulation, we cross-validated a set of strategies on participants’ data we had 
collected for a previous project (Volstorf et al., 2011). There, 126 participants played the Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with 20 computer partners in a blocked interaction pattern which was 
repeated for 10 times. Computer partners either played AllD or TFT. We assigned participants to 
either of three interaction groups which differed in the proportion of computer partners’ types. In 
the “defectors-rare” condition,  20% of interaction partners defected,  80% cooperated.  In the 
“equal-proportion”  condition,  50% defected,  50% cooperated,  and in  the  “cooperators-rare” 
condition, 80% of partners defected and 20% cooperated. Each type comprised half male and 
half female partners.
As shown in Table C1, each strategy can be represented by multiple gene constellations. 
For the cross-validation, we fed in all gene constellations per strategy that won at least one run 
of the simulation with  SD = 0.1 (without noise) and  SD = 5.0 (including noise). When gene 
constellations  were not  available,  because  the  strategies  had not  won in the simulation,  we 
constructed a small parameter set. The latter we did only for non-contingent and 1-step memory 
strategies, though, because they can be described (and thus cross-validated) independently of the 
chromosome. At the cross-validation including noise, the programme additionally entailed noise 
in the form of a normal distribution with SD = 5.0 with each cross-validated move.
To evaluate the cross-validation, we used a predictive accuracy measure similar to the 
accumulative prediction error  (Wagenmakers, Grünwald & Steyvers, 2006). Because the data 
are equivalent to time-series data, one does not take n-1 observations into account to predict the 
nth observation  (i.e.,  the  size  of  the  data  set  for  fitting  is  constant;  leave-one-out  cross-
validation). Instead, the data set to base the prediction on (i.e., fit the model) grows continuously 
as one proceeds. For each observation, we made a prediction based on the previous observations 
and corresponding to each strategy. We assigned a “1” for correct predictions and a “0” for 
incorrect ones. Instead of summing the errors (0s) and choosing the model (i.e., strategy) with 
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the smallest average error, we summed the correct predictions (1s) and chose the model with the 
best  average  prediction.  Since  most  of  the  strategies  decide  what  to  do  on  the  first  move 
probabilistically, we repeated the cross-validation for five times.
Software
We  wrote  the  code  for  running  the  simulation  in  Free  Pascal  (version  2.4.0).  For 
categorizing  the  chromosomes  into  strategies,  creating  the  figures,  and  cross-validating  the 
strategies on participants’ data,  we used R (2011, version 2.13.2 ),  and the packages Hmisc 
(error bars Figure 3.3;  Harrell, 2010) and pwr (to calculate Cohen’s  h;  Champely, 2009). All 
programmes are available upon request.
Design and data analysis
To test Hypothesis 1 (“Impression-based strategies are more robust to noise than 1-step 
memory strategies in maintaining cooperation and surviving in an evolutionary simulation.”), 
we ran an evolutionary simulation using a genetic algorithm. As the independent variable, we 
varied the noise level, that is, the standard deviation of a normal distribution around the correct 
impression  index/weight  (with  the  effective  onset  of  noise  at  SD =  0.4).  As  the  dependent 
variables, we assessed  the proportions of strategies winning the 10,000 runs of the simulation 
and the cooperation rate in the population of strategies. Each incident of cooperation (one-sided 
or  mutual)  in  the  generation  after  a  run  stopped,  divided  by all  moves,  contributed  to  the 
cooperation rate. For descriptive statistics, we report mean (M), standard deviation (SD), range, 
median (Mdn), and mode (Mo). For comparisons between results, we give the mean with 95% 
confidence interval (CI; e.g.,  Cumming et al., 2007) and either Cohen’s (1977) d (with means) 
or Cohen’s h effect size (with proportions; Cohen’s conventions for d and h: small effect size: 
0.20, medium effect size: 0.50, large effect size: 0.80).
To test Hypothesis 2 (“Impression-based strategies better predict human behaviour than 1-
step memory strategies.”), we cross-validated a set of strategies on participants’ behaviour from 
an earlier experiment  (Volstorf et al.,  2011). As independent variable, we cross-validated the 
behaviour without and including noise by feeding in parameters from the simulation with SD = 
0.1  or  SD =  5.0.  The  predictive  accuracy  of  cross-validation,  the  dependent  variable,  we 
determined by dividing the number of correct predictions by the number of cases in which the 
strategy  made  a  prediction  over  all  of  20  partners,  five  cross-validation  repetitions  per 
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participant, and over all gene constellations. By chance (and with the Random strategy), this 
accuracy  is  at  0.5.  We  report  three  measures  of  cross-validation  performance:  First,  the 
frequency with which a  strategy best-predicted  participants’ behaviour  (i.e.,  had the  highest 
predictive accuracy) among the set of strategies, second, the value of predictive accuracy, and 
third, a combined measure of both.
Results
The simulation
Figure 3.3 shows the results of 10,000 runs of the simulation for each standard deviation 
representing the level of noise. 
Figure 3.3.  Proportion of strategies winning among 10,000 runs over an increasing level of 
noise  (represented  by  the  standard  deviation  of  a  normal  distribution  around  the  correct 
impression index/weight). For better clarity, we only display the best seven strategies. The green 
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line (with error bars) shows the cooperation rate in the generation after a run stopped averaged 
over 10,000 runs per noise level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Although  they  won  a  few  times  (Appendix  Figure  C2),  none  of  the  1-step  memory 
strategies ever dominated the population of winner strategies over the different levels of noise. 
Among the seven strategies with the highest proportions of runs won, there was only one 1-step 
memory  strategy,  probGrim.  ProbGrim  ranked  third  behind  two  non-contingent  strategies 
(D_1st_1–25C  and  D_1st_26–50C)  at  the  simulation  without  noise.  The  situation  for 
impression-based strategies was similar (Appendix Figure C3). Among the seven best strategies, 
there was just one impression-based strategy, iGrim_Adding. At the simulation without noise, 
iGrim_Adding ranked behind probGrim, but they switched ranks shortly after the onset of noise 
until  SD = 5. Aggregating proportions per strategy group and over noise levels, impression-
based  strategies  won  more  proportions  of  runs  than  1-step  memory  strategies  without  and 
including noise (without noise [SD = 0.1–0.3]: Mimpression-based = 0.35 ± 0.00 CI, M1-step memory = 0.15 
± 0.01 CI, h = 0.49; including noise [SD = 0.4–5.0]: Mimpression-based = 0.26 ± 0.00 CI, M1-step memory = 
0.10  ±  0.00  CI,  h =  0.45).  Before  and  after  the  onset  of  noise,  non-contingent  strategies 
dominated the population of winning strategies (without noise: Mnon-contingent = 0.50 ± 0.01 CI, hnon-
contingent_1-step memory = 0.78, hnon-contingent_impression-based = 0.29; including noise: Mnon-contingent = 0.64 ± 0.01 
CI,  hnon-contingent_1-step memory = 1.23,  hnon-contingent_impression-based = 0.79). Among the seven best strategies, 
there  were  five  non-contingent  strategies,  of  which  two  vanished  with  the  onset  of  noise 
(D_1st_1–25C, D_1st_26–50C), because they cannot be represented with the chromosome we 
used  without  becoming  noise-prone.  After  the  D_1st-strategies  vanished,  probDef  rapidly 
increased until reaching a plateau at  around 51% of runs won. From  SD = 1.6 on, probDef 
declined and another defecting non-contingent strategy (C_1–25) increased, taking over at SD = 
3.8 and winning more of the 10,000 runs than any other individual strategy (see also Appendix 
Figure C1).
The seven best strategies mainly defect, resulting in low cooperation rates without and 
with  small  levels  of  noise.  The  D_1st-strategies  (D_1st_1–25C,  D_1st_26–50C)  defect 
throughout except for the first interaction where they cooperate with less than 26% (Mcooperation rate 
= 1.3, SD = 1.1, range = 0.1–3.2, Mdn = 1.3, Mo = 0.7) and 51% respectively (Mcooperation rate = 3.7, 
SD = 3.5, range = 2.0–5.5, Mdn = 3.7, Mo = 3.4). Without noise, probGrim (Mind = 45.4, SD = 
45.2, range = 1–100, Mdn = 42, Mo = 1) and iGrim_Adding (Mind = 47.5, SD = 47.3, range = 1–
100,  Mdn = 47,  Mo = 10)  more likely  began with defection.  Regardless of their  partners’ 
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behaviour, they stuck to D (except for 10.0/7.4/0.8% of the cases with dc = 0/dd = 0/[dc = 0 and 
dd = 0] for probGrim and 9.4/10.8/0.6% for iGrim_Adding when there was an ind% probability 
to cooperate). If they cooperated, they punished exploitation (CD) with defection. Even in the 
case of mutual cooperation, continuous cooperation was not guaranteed (with cc = 0 [probGrim: 
in 30.3%, iGrim_Adding: in 18.3%] and ind < 100%). ProbDef,  without noise,  began more 
likely with defection (Mind = 28.3, SD = 28.1, range = 1–100, Mdn = 20, Mo = 1). Regardless of 
its partners’ behaviour, it stuck to D (except for 60.2/44.4/4.7% of the cases with dc = 0/dd = 0/
[dc = 0 and dd = 0] when there was an ind% probability to cooperate). As soon as probDef  
cooperated, though (cc/cd < 0), it would play D for the rest of the encounter (with ada = 0) or 
until the end of the window size respectively (with ada = 1).
The increase of the cooperation rate despite mostly defecting dominating strategies can 
have two reasons: First, the rise of two non-contingent C_strategies (C_1–25 and C_26–49) that, 
however, only cooperate on every move with less than 26% (cooperation rate exemplary at the 
simulation with SD = 5.0: M = 11.8, SD = 6.8, range = 1.4–27.3, Mdn = 11, Mo = 1.9) and 50% 
respectively (cooperation rate exemplary at the simulation with SD = 5.0: M = 35.5, SD = 30.5, 
range = 25.2–50.2, Mdn = 34.4, Mo = 28.7); second, noise. For the three noise-prone strategies 
probGrim, iGrim_Adding, and probDef to increase their cooperation rates, the probability to 
cooperate when indifferent (gene ind) would have to increase. The ind parameters for probGrim 
(without noise: Mind = 45.4 ± 1.1 CI and exemplary for noise at the simulation with SD = 5.0: 
Mind = 39.5 ± 4.9 CI; d = 0.19) and iGrim_Adding (without noise: Mind = 47.5 ± 1.2 CI, SD = 5.0: 
Mind = 29.2 ± 3.3 CI;  d = 0.61) decrease with increasing noise, though. For probDef (without 
noise: Mind = 28.3 ± 1.0 CI, SD = 5.0: Mind = 36.3 ± 1.4 CI; d = 0.31), ind increases, but given 
this ind, probDef’s cooperation rate would not exceed 0.19 without noise. If the three strategy’s 
cooperation rates, despite of low ind, increased, it would be due to noise. This is in fact what we 
found (see Figure 3.4 exemplary for probDef’s cooperation rates).
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Figure 3.4. Cooperation rate (proportion of cooperation of all interactions) in the generation 
after a run stopped (i.e., all populations’ chromosomes converted to one common pattern, one 
strategy) for all runs when probDef won. Boxplots show the median as a line inside the box, 
which contains 50% of the data (upper border = 75th percentile, lower border = 25th percentile). 
The whiskers range from 5 to 95% of the data, outliers are represented as circles.
The cross-validation
Cross-validation without noise
Our  predictive  accuracy  measure  of  cross-validation  sums  the  number  of  correct 
predictions and divides it by the number of cases in which the strategy makes a prediction over 
all  of  20  partners,  five  cross-validation  repetitions  per  participant,  and  over  all  gene 
constellations  from the  simulation  results  with  SD =  0.1.  Because  they  never  won  in  the 
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simulation  and  gene  constellations  were  not  available,  we  constructed  parameter  sets  for 
Apologizer,  probApologizer,  Cooperator,  Temptation,  Shy,  AntiTFT,  probAntiTFT,  Win-
Change,  Lose-Stay  (WCLS),  WSLC,  Lurer,  GreedyTFT,  Sucker  (all  1-step  memory),  and 
ExtremeAlternate  (non-contingent).  We  omitted  iApologizer_Averaging, 
iApologizer_ConAveraging,  all  iTemptation  forms,  iAntiTFT_ConAveraging for  which  there 
were no parameters from the simulation to cross-validate.
The predictive accuracy determines which strategy predicts a participant’s behaviour best. 
We allowed ties so that several strategies can predict equally well. There were ties in 10 cases, 
resulting in 136 winner strategies with 126 participants. Counting the frequency each strategy 
was  best-predicting,  Figure  3.5  gives  the  order  among  the  136  best-predicting  strategies. 
Impression-based strategies (iGrim_ConAdding, iGrim_ConAveraging, iSucker_ConAveraging, 
iShy_ConAveraging, iSucker_ConAdding, iShy_ConAdding) were more frequent  than 1-step 
memory strategies  (Shy,  Temptation,  TFT,  probWCLS,  AntiTFT,  probTemptation,  Grim;  24 
versus  20).  The  most  frequent  best-predicting  strategies,  however,  were  non-contingent 
strategies like AllD, AllC, or variants thereof (with 92 best-predicted participants).
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Figure  3.5.  Order  of  best-predicting  strategies  (i.e.,  with  highest  predictive  accuracy)  by 
frequency  for  126  participants.  The  legend  displays  the  order  of  individual  strategies 
independent of strategy group.
So far, we have only looked at the order of strategies by considering the frequency with 
which  they had the  highest  predictive accuracy (number of  correct  predictions  /  number of 
predictions) per participant. The strategies, however, differ in predictive accuracy (Figure 3.6). 
For example, a strategy might have repeatedly best-predicted participants’ behaviour among all 
strategies we tested (Figure 3.5), but if the quotient is only around 0.6, it is not a very accurate  
prediction. 
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Figure  3.6.  Order  of  best-predicting  strategies  by  predictive  accuracy  of  cross-validation 
(number of correct predictions / number of predictions). Numbers in the bars give the frequency 
of  best-predicted  participants  by the  corresponding strategy.  Error  bars  are  95% confidence 
intervals and only depicted for strategies with frequency > 1. The legend displays the order of 
individual strategies independent of strategy group.
The predictive accuracy of the six impression-based strategies (Mimpression-based = 0.77 ± 0.04 
CI) does not differ from that of the seven 1-step memory strategies (M1-step memory = 0.72 ± 0.06 
CI).  The  11  non-contingent  strategies  (Mnon-contingent =  0.83  ±  0.02  CI)  predict  participants’ 
behaviour better than 1-step memory strategies (h = 0.26) and impression-based strategies (h = 
0.16).
For  a  full  picture  of  the  best-predicting  strategies’ cross-validation  performance,  we 
multiplied  the  frequency  each  strategy  was  best  predicting  (as  the  proportion  of  all  best-
predicting  strategies)  with  the  strategy’s  mean  predictive  accuracy:  combined  measure  = 
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(frequency of  strategy /  136)  Mpredictive  accuracy.  This  way,  a  rare  strategy with  high  predictive 
accuracy can be outcompeted by a more frequent strategy with lower predictive accuracy. Figure 
3.7 (left panel) shows the order of strategies by this combined measure.
Figure  3.7.  Order  of  combined  measure  of  cross-validation  by  multiplying  the  strategy’s 
proportion  of  all  strategies  and  the  strategy’s  predictive  accuracy  (number  of  correct 
predictions / number of predictions). Numbers in the bars give the frequency of best-predicted 
participants by the corresponding strategy. The left panel shows the results for cross-validation 
without noise and the right panel the results for cross-validation including noise. The legends 
display the order of individual strategies independent of strategy group.
The combined measure for the cross-validation of impression-based strategies (Mimpression-
based = 0.14) does not differ from that of 1-step memory strategies (M1-step  memory = 0.11). Non-
contingent strategies (Mnon-contingent = 0.57) have a higher combined cross-validation measure than 
1-step memory (h = 1.03) and impression-based strategies (h = 0.94).
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In sum, although more frequently best-predicting (Figure 3.5), impression-based strategies 
predict participants’ behaviour equivalently to 1-step memory strategies (Figure 3.6) so that the 
combined measure does not differ (Figure 3.7, left panel). The most frequent and best-predicting 
strategies, however, are non-contingent strategies, above all AllD.
Cross-validation including noise
For  the  cross-validation  including  noise,  the  predictive  accuracy sums  the  number  of 
correct  predictions  and  divides  it  by  the  number  of  cases  in  which  the  strategy  makes  a 
prediction over all of 20 partners, five cross-validation repetitions per participant, and over all 
gene constellations from the simulation results with SD = 5.0. Because they never won in the 
simulation  and  gene  constellations  were  not  available,  we  constructed  parameter  sets  for 
Cooperator, Shy, WSLC, and TFT (all 1-step memory). We omitted D_1st_1–25C, D_1st_26–
50C,  D_1st_51–75C,  D_1st_76–100C,  C_1st_0–24C,  C_1st_25–49C,  C_1st_50–74C, 
C_1st_75–99C, and ExtremeAlternate which cannot be represented by the chromosome without 
becoming noise-prone. 
There  were  ties  in  4  cases,  resulting  in  130  winner  strategies  with  126  participants. 
Counting  the  frequency  each  strategy  was  best-predicting,  impression-based  strategies 
(iShy_ConAdding,  iGrim_Adding,  iTemptation_Adding,  iShy_Adding,  iGrim_ConAdding, 
iSucker_ConAdding,  iCooperator_Averaging)  were,  as  with  cross-validation  without  noise, 
more frequent than 1-step memory strategies (Grim, Temptation, Sucker; 32 versus 7). The most 
frequent best-predicting strategies, however, were the non-contingent strategies AllD, AllC, and 
C_75–99 with 91 best-predicted participants. 
As  with  the  cross-validation  without  noise,  the  predictive  accuracy  of  the  seven 
impression-based strategies (Mimpression-based = 0.64 ± 0.02 CI) does not differ from that of the three 
1-step memory strategies (M1-step  memory = 0.64  ± 0.03 CI). The three non-contingent strategies 
(Mnon-contingent = 0.80 ± 0.03 CI) predict participants’ behaviour better than impression-based (h = 
0.37) and 1-step memory strategies (h = 0.36).
For  a  full  picture  of  the  best-predicting  strategies’ cross-validation  performance,  we 
multiplied  the  frequency  each  strategy  was  best  predicting  (as  the  proportion  of  all  best-
predicting strategies) with the strategy’s mean predictive accuracy: (frequency of strategy / 130) 
Mpredictive accuracy. Figure 3.7 (right panel) shows the order of strategies by this combined measure. 
The combined measure for the cross-validation of impression-based strategies (Mimpression-based = 
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0.16) is, in contrast to the cross-validation without noise, higher than that of 1-step memory 
strategies (M1-step memory = 0.03; h = 0.44). As with cross-validation without noise, non-contingent 
strategies  (Mnon-contingent = 0.56)  have a  higher  combined cross-validation measure than 1-step 
memory (h = 1.32) and impression-based strategies (h = 0.88).
In sum, impression-based and 1-step memory strategies predict participants equally well, 
but  because  impression-based  strategies  more  often  predict  participants’  behaviour,  the 
combined measure of impression-based strategies is higher than that of 1-step memory strategies 
(Figure 3.7, right panel). The most frequent and best-predicting strategies, however, are non-
contingent strategies, above all AllD. Table 3.3 summarizes the cross-validation results. 
Table 3.3 
Summary of cross-validation results without and including noise as the order of strategies.
cross-validation
without noise (using 
simulation parameters with 
SD = 0.1)
including noise (using 
parameters with SD = 5.0)
frequency with which 
participants are best predicted
1. non-contingent strategies
2. impression-based strategies
3. 1-step memory strategies
1. non-contingent strategies
2. impression-based strategies
3. 1-step memory strategies
quality with which 
participants are best predicted
1. non-contingent strategies
2. impression-based and 1-
step memory strategies
1. non-contingent strategies
2. impression-based and 1-
step memory strategies
combination of frequency and 
quality with which 
participants are best predicted
1. non-contingent strategies




3. 1-step memory strategies
Characteristics of the best-predicting impression-based strategies
Among  impression-based  strategies,  the  subforms  iGrim and  iShy dominate  the  best-
predicting strategies without (see exemplary the first three ranks: iGrim_ConAdding:  Mcombined 
measure = 0.05, iGrim_ConAveraging:  Mcombined measure = 0.03, iShy_ConAveraging:  Mcombined measure = 
0.02) and including noise (iGrim_Adding: Mcombined measure = 0.04, iShy_ConAdding: Mcombined measure 
= 0.04,  iTemptation_Adding:  Mcombined  measure = 0.03).  IGrim and iShy are antipodes: Whereas 
iGrim, if  it  begins with cooperation, continues to cooperate and punishes exploitation (CD), 
iShy,  if  it  begins with defection,  continues to defect  and reinforces cooperation (DC). Both 
forms have in common that if they begin with defection while the partner defects as well, they 
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will continue to defect with a certain probability and, if so, do as well as the yardstick AllD. At 
the same time, for both, there are probabilities for mutual cooperation which yields more payoff 
than  mutual  defection  and  allows  outcompeting  AllD.  On  the  other  hand,  the  third-ranked 
iTemptation at the cross-validation including noise, cooperates after mutual defection but tries to 
exploit the partner after partner-sided cooperation (DC). One-step memory versions of iGrim, 
iShy, and iTemptation are also among the best-ranked 1-step memory strategies without (Shy: 
Mcombined measure = 0.03, Temptation: Mcombined measure = 0.02) and including noise (Grim: Mcombined measure 
= 0.02, Temptation: Mcombined measure = 0.01).
Discussion
We tested 1-step memory, impression-based, and non-contingent strategies competitively 
regarding their  robustness  to  noise.  To assess  whether  impression-based strategies  are  more 
robust to noise than 1-step memory strategies, we ran an evolutionary simulation using a genetic 
algorithm.  There,  agents,  consisting  of  chromosomes  that  represent  features  of  strategies, 
interacted in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games and spread in relation to their success in the 
population,  supplemented  by  crossing  over  and  mutation.  We  varied  the  level  of  noise  in 
processing the partners’ behaviour  and found that,  without  and including noise,  impression-
based  strategies  outperformed  1-step  memory  strategies  in  maintaining  cooperation  and 
surviving. This confirms Hypothesis 1.
To test whether impression-based strategies are better able to predict human behaviour 
than 1-step memory strategies, we cross-validated the strategies on participants’ behaviour from 
an earlier experiment. We found that, without noise, impression-based strategies result as best-
predicting  strategies  more  often  but  predict  participants’ behaviour  about  as  well  as  1-step 
memory strategies so that the combined measure is  equivalent.  Including noise, impression-
based  and  1-step  memory strategies  predict  participants  equally  well,  but  impression-based 
strategies more often predict participants’ behaviour so that the combined measure is higher. 
This  confirms  Hypothesis  2.  Winner  of  the  simulation  and  best  in  predicting  participants’ 
behaviour, though, are non-contingent strategies. 
Reviewing the results
The simulation results surprised us in various ways. First, the population of chromosomes 
converted  to  one  common  pattern  of  gene  parameters  (i.e.,  strategy)  already  after  a  few 
generations (Mgenerations = 78.2 ± 0.1 CI; not depicted). If one does not stop the simulation then, 
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the fluctuations in the continuous genes (ind,  cc–dd, ws) do not change the outcome much, 
whereas they are much more influential with the binary genes (ada, rec). Letting the simulation 
run until 1 Mio generations never fixes the population with respect to these two genes. Lindgren 
(1991), too, reported a constant change between stasis and unstable dynamic behaviour in the 
evolution of genes over the generations of one run.
This refers to the second observation: There was never just one winner over the 10,000 
runs (i.e., 100% of runs won). Stopping the simulation after the first stabilization and repeating 
this procedure lead to an abundance of strategies to which the populations convert—especially 
before  the  onset  of  noise.  Even  from  SD =  0.4  on  and  with  probDef  and,  later,  C_1–25 
dominating  the  population,  there  were  few  other  strategies  present.  Studies  observing 
simulations  with  varying noise  over  generations  (Lomborg,  1996) or  stopping  them after  a 
predefined number  of  generations  (Miller,  1996,  Sherratt  & Roberts,  1999)  did  not  specify 
whether the population had converged to one common strategy in the course of the generations. 
We,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  systematically  (i.e.,  over  all  noise  levels)  investigate  the 
generations after the population had converged. A combination of the methods could clarify 
whether, after a dynamic phase, the population again evolves towards the once converged state 
or whether a different strategy would have won each time. Still,  it  remains open whether a 
strategy can be declared winner, because it is the first the population converges to or because it  
leads repeatedly to stable states in the course of the generations. As we needed a strict criterion 
to  run  repeated  simulations  per  noise  level  and  over  noise  levels  and  one  which  is 
computationally feasible we chose “the first strategy the population converges to”.
Third, the cooperation rate in the generation after a run stops increased with increasing 
noise. Other studies with varying noise found the opposite result (Lomborg, 1996, Miller, 1996, 
Sherratt  & Roberts,  1999,  Stevens  et  al.,  2011).  Our  implementation  of  noise  as  a  normal 
distribution with varying standard deviations around the correct impression index (with ada = 0) 
or weight (with ada = 1) deviates from the definition as the “probability of doing the opposite 
move” (as in Donninger, 1986, Müller, 1987, Lindgren, 1991, Nowak & Sigmund, 1993, Wu & 
Axelrod, 1995, Lomborg, 1996, Miller, 1996, Sherratt & Roberts, 1999, Wakano & Yamamura, 
2001,  Hruschka & Henrich, 2006). That is because the concept of an impression index as the 
basis for deciding what to do (instead of the partner’s previous move) required rethinking. We 
decided against choosing from a uniform distribution over all possible reactions (as did Sherratt 
& Roberts,  1999).  Instead,  we opted for a normal  distribution,  much as Bendor  (1987) and 
colleagues did when they added an error term with M = 0 and SD = 8 to the (continuous) benefit 
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the  player  received  from  the  partner  (Bendor  et  al.,  1991).  Because  cooperation  in  our 
simulation was not continuous but the impression of the partner was, we set  the impression 
index/weight equal to the mean of the normal distribution.
That cooperation rates increase with increasing noise is astonishing, as all noise-prone 
strategies  that  face  noise  in  form  of  a  normal  distribution  around  the  correct  impression 
index/weight have the same probabilities for indices/weights to the left and right of the correct  
index/weight—where left leads to decreasing and eventually negative indices/weights resulting 
in defection and right leads to increasing and eventually positive indices/weights resulting in 
cooperation.  Before  accepting  this  as  another  piece  of  evidence  for  the  emergence  of 
cooperation under noise, we have to admit that increasing noise starts the decline of noise-prone 
strategies (for probDef after an initial increase until  SD = 1.6). Whereas without noise (at the 
simulation with  SD = 0.1–0.3), 18 of the 77 noise-prone strategies had proportions of 10,000 
runs won > 1% (7 with > 3%), including noise there are just 12 with runs won > 1% (3 with >  
3%). Although noise increases cooperation in the population, this increase does not seem to be 
advantageous for noise-prone strategies. Their decline paves the way for noise-independent non-
contingent strategies like C_1–25 and C_25–49. With a proportion of (7 / 84 =) 8% of all tested 
strategies at the simulation with SD = 5.0, noise-independent non-contingent strategies sum to > 
40% of 10,000 runs won.
Regarding  the  cross-validation,  we  were  surprised  that  in  a  large  proportion  of  cases 
mostly  defecting  strategies  best-predicted  participants’  behaviour  (cross-validation  without 
noise: AllD,  D_1st_76–100C which cooperates on the first move with 76–100% and defects 
from then on; cross-validation including noise: AllD). Which strategy participants pursue could 
depend on the partners with which they interact. In the experiment from which we took the 
participants’  behaviour,  there  were  three  between-subjects  conditions  that  differed  in  the 
proportion of partner types: defectors rare (20% defectors, 80% cooperators), equal proportion 
(50% defectors,  50% cooperators),  and  cooperators  rare  (80% defectors,  20% cooperators). 
Because the proportions of partner types may influence how participants react, we consider the 
frequency of best-predicting strategies per condition. In fact, the number of participants best-
predicted by AllD at the cross-validation without noise increased with increasing defectors in the 
condition  (6  participants  in  the  defectors-rare,  11  in  the  equal-proportion,  and  19  in  the 
cooperators-rare condition). The same was true for AllD at the cross-validation including noise 
(13 participants in the defectors-rare, 23 in the equal-proportion, and 34 in the cooperators-rare 
condition). Here, also the opposite trend showed: The number of participants best predicted by 
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the  (mostly)  cooperating  strategies  AllC  (12,  2,  1)  and  C_75–99  (4,  2,  0)  decreased  with 
increasing defectors in the condition.
Impression-based and 1-step memory strategies predicted participants’ behaviour less well 
than non-contingent strategies. Still, at the cross-validation including noise, impression-based 
strategies better-predicted participants’ behaviour than 1-step memory strategies. As with non-
contingent strategies,  those impression-based strategies best-predicted participants’ behaviour 
that more likely defected: iGrim_Adding (at the simulation with  SD = 5.0:  Mind = 29.2,  SD = 
23.5, range = 0–100,  Mdn = 24,  Mo = 7), iShy_ConAdding (at the simulation with SD = 5.0: 
Mind = 41.2,  SD = 22.1, range = 1–86,  Mdn = 36,  Mo = 36), and iTemptation_Adding (at the 
simulation with SD = 5.0: Mind = 25.2, SD = 21.0, range = 0–88, Mdn = 20, Mo = 5) all more 
likely began with defection. After the first move, iGrim_Adding (except for 4.1/8.2/0% of the 
cases with dc = 0/dd = 0/[dc = 0 and dd = 0] when there was an ind% probability to cooperate)  
more likely stuck to D regardless of the partners’ behaviour, iShy_Adding more likely stuck to 
D if the partner defected as well. It is symptomatic that the more vulnerable to exploitation the 
lower ranked was a strategy in predicting participants’ behaviour: Whereas iGrim_Adding does 
not  cooperate  after  DC  or  DD  (except  for  some  remote  probabilities,  see  above), 
iShy_ConAdding cooperates after DC, and iTemptation_Adding even cooperates after DD.
Other authors, too, found that, given noise, more information from the common history 
between player and partner is advantageous in contrast to 1-step memory strategies (Bendor, 
1987, Lindgren, 1991, Hruschka & Henrich, 2006, Anh et al., 2011). Anh et al. (2011) describe 
the advantage of the extended knowledge with: “Having a greater memory size allows longer-
term  mutual  trusts/distrusts  to  be  built,  and  hence  enables  better  recognition  of  erroneous 
moves”. Whereas previous studies manifested extended knowledge of the partner’s behaviour in 
the window size of past moves, in our results, impression-based strategies with potentially long 
memory  (Averaging/ConAveraging)  only  ranked  last  among  seven  strategies.  Instead, 
impression-based strategies succeeded that combine their extended knowledge about the partner 
in a single index one has to keep in mind (Adding/ConAdding).
The impression-based strategies’ advantage of being immune to outliers of a partner’s 
general behaviour is more prominent with regular in contrast to contradictory families. There 
were exclusively contradictory families among the best impression-based strategies at the cross-
validation  without  noise  but  three  contradictory  and  four  regular  families  among  the  best 
strategies  including noise.  Contradictory families’ being more provocable and less  forgiving 
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than regular ones seem to be features less successful with noise. 
Implications
One-step memory and impression-based strategies hardly played a role in the simulation. 
In contrast, non-contingent strategies dominated the population of winning strategies before and 
after the onset of noise. This has implications for the design of new strategies to explain the 
emergence of cooperation and questions the success of 1-step memory strategies in previous 
studies. We conclude from participants’ behaviour on which we based the cross-validation that 
participants  pursue  even simpler  strategies  than  impression-based and 1-step memory.  They 
stick to either C or D for the most part (without noise: AllD, D_1st_26–50C, C_1st_75–99C; 
including  noise:  AllD,  AllC,  iGrim_Adding),  only  influenced  by  the  partner  insofar  as  it 
becomes more likely D the more defector partners they interact with (without and including 
noise;  including  noise  the  more  defectors  the  less  AllC,  too).  Thus,  participants  display 
ecological rationality (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007) by adapting their strategy to the environment, 
that  is,  the majority of their  partners’ behaviour.  Participants do not seem to pay too much 
attention to the individual partners’ strategies, though, by reacting to their every move (1-step 
memory strategies) or even general behaviour (impression-based strategies). After all, is human 
behaviour,  at  least  in  our  artificial  laboratory  situation,  not  best  described  by  reciprocity 
(Hammerstein,  2003) or  even contingency on the partner? It  seems the guideline for  future 
strategies should be “less is more” not only what concerns the requirements to memory but also 
to contingency (Gigerenzer et al., 1999).
As a way to find these strategies, we deem a genetic algorithm a good method, because the 
strategies’ parameters result from success—not from the experimenter’s choice. As long as the 
experimenter chooses the set of strategies to compete against each other, there remain doubts 
whether a winner in such a simulation cannot be beaten by a strategy that was not included in 
the set  of  strategies.  Some authors  pit  strategies  evolved by a  genetic  algorithm simulation 
against famous strategies from the history of the research field (like TFT, WSLC, AllD) that they 
spare mutation and crossover (Golbeck, 2002, Dyer, 2004, Scali, 2006, Brunauer et al., 2007). 
Their justification is to test the evolved strategies against the best known ones. Under which 
circumstances were the best known strategies the best, though? Maybe these strategies would 
have never succeeded when given the same probability to evolve in an evolutionary simulation
—as our simulation results show where TFT, WSLC, and even AllD are not among the most 
successful strategies.
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Even though our genetic algorithm allowed for three groups of strategies (1-step memory, 
impression-based, non-contingent) and many subforms, at cross-validation without noise, none 
of  them  won  with  an  overwhelming  combined  measure.  Strategies  with  good  predictive 
accuracy were not very frequent (Figure 3.6). At cross-validation including noise, on the other 
hand,  at  least  the  highest  ranking  three  strategies  with  respect  to  combined  measure  also 
succeeded at frequency and quality (not depicted). Still, the challenge will be to design a genetic 
algorithm with the potential for even more and better-predicting strategies.
Limitations
Our  simulation  has  the  following  disadvantages.  First,  we  applied  noise  to  the 
chromosome, not just specific strategies, but decided that, in contrast to other work (Bendor, 
1993,  Anh et  al.,  2011),  non-contingent  strategies  are  not  influenced by noise.  This  meant, 
though, that we had to discard some non-contingent strategies with the onset of noise (D_1st- 
and  C_1st-strategies,  ExtremeAlternate),  because  their  categorizations  would  have  become 
noise-prone.
Second, 1-step memory and impression-based strategies rely on both, the partner’s and the 
own  previous  move,  to  determine  the  behaviour  for  the  current  encounter.  Whereas  our 
experimental  setup  excluded  missing  moves  by  the  partner  (i.e.,  a  programmed  computer 
strategy), the player (i.e., the participant) could miss his move (intentionally or unintentionally). 
If the player, for example, did not decide to cooperate or defect on the first move, he still saw 
the partner’s first move. There is no way to know whether the player behaved unaffectedly in the 
official second encounter (which would have let us to treat it as the first move and compare it 
with gene ind) or already based his move on the partner’s behaviour. For the latter case, the 
chromosome did not offer a way to value the player’s move. Here, genes “nac”/“nad” would 
probably help by specifying what to do if the player’s move was not available (NA), whereas the 
partner  cooperated  or  defected  on  the  previous  move.  In  our  implementation,  Adding  and 
ConAdding strategies take the impression index from the second to last move (with NA on the 
first  move:  impression  index  =  0)  as  the  basis  for  the  current  move.  Averaging  and 
ConAveraging strategies ignore the encounter just like they do weight genes = 0.
A limitation regarding the data we used for the cross-validation is that we gained them 
from  participants  who  knew  they  played  against  computer  partners.  The  knowledge  of 
interacting with a computer, compared to a human, partner (when, in fact, both partner types 
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adhered to the same strategy) decreased cooperation rates in Abric’s (1984) experiment. Sanfey 
et  al.  (2003) reported  that  participants  rejected  unfair  offers  from  computer  partners  at  a 
significantly  lower  rate  than  those  from human  partners  which  the  authors  attributed  to  a 
stronger emotional reaction to humans than computers.
Future research
What  are  possible  improvements  of  the  simulation?  First,  if  one  interprets  noise  as 
memory errors, the realization in our simulation amounts to a fixed memory error not taking into 
account the time or number of other interaction partners lying between two interactions with the 
same  partner.  An  alternative  would  be  a  partner-  or  time-wise  memory  error  leading  to  a 
regression to the threshold between impressions the longer back the last interaction was.
Second, in our simulation, we set the threshold between cooperation and defection at 0, 
determined with a probability how likely an agent cooperates, and kept the threshold constant. A 
modification could be to have the threshold flexible throughout the interactions. Where and how 
does the decision-maker set the threshold in the first place? There are some approaches in which 
an agent observes his partner or other partners in the environment before interacting with him 
(Braver & Barnett, 1976, Pollock & Dugatkin, 1992, Nowak & Sigmund, 1998).
This refers to a third aspect of our simulation’s setup: In everyday life, there are not only 
isolated interactions with partners, but one is publicly visible towards third parties in terms of a 
reputation. Strategic reputation-building may play an additional role in how someone reacts and 
whom he helps (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009).
Our results indicate that participants might use other strategies than impression-based or 1-
step memory. One approach to get at them is to broaden the categories. Different people can 
have different categories (Medin, Lynch, Coley & Atran, 1997)—not everyone has to distinguish 
“good” and “bad”. Nevertheless, humans tend to categorize items in their environment in binary 
distinctions, and we think “good” and “bad” are suitable. By incorporating one’s own move into 
the formation of the partner’s impression, more categories could arise, for example, “naive” or 
“patient”. This would require building an impression index for oneself parallel to the one for the 
partner, as done in image-scoring strategies (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998).
Another possibility is that humans adhere to different strategies depending on whether 
they know the partner (Aktipis, 2006, Hruschka & Henrich, 2006) or depending on the partner 
type. We did not differentiate the cross-validation for partner types and implicitly suggested that 
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participants pursued one strategy for all partner types. It could, however, be that humans have a 
toolbox of strategies from which they choose depending on the environment  (Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999).
Although we could confirm both hypotheses,  impression-based strategies’ performance 
was  not  impressive.  Other  strategies  than  impression-based  and  1-step  memory were  more 
successful  in  the  simulation  and  the  cross-validation—namely  non-contingent  strategies. 
Participants seem to use even simpler strategies than relying on their partner’s previous move or 




The most famous strategy to promote and maintain cooperation,  TFT, is  not robust to 
noise in form of perception or decision errors. Although some of its 1-step memory relatives 
were  promoted  as  noise-robust  alternatives,  they,  too,  require  to  remember  each  partner’s 
previous move. In Chapter 1, my collaborators and I investigated whether this requirement is 
cognitively feasible for a boundedly rational decision maker and tested robustness to noise given 
experimentally  derived  noise  levels.  In  Chapter  2,  my  collaborators  and  I  explored  the 
cognitively more feasible strategy of assigning partner types and tested whether participants 
adapt  their  strategy to  the  environment.  In  Chapter  3,  my collaborator  and I  modelled  the 
process of assigning partner types by impression building and tested its robustness to noise and 
its ability to predict behaviour.
Tit-For-Tat and its relatives are not cognitively feasible and noise-robust
The experiment in Chapter 1 was designed to meet the requirements of 1-step memory 
strategies by asking participants to recall their partners’ previous move. That participants had 
high memory error rates of 10–24% (depending on the number of partners) confirmed that 1-
step  memory  strategies  make  cognitively  infeasible  memory  requirements.  Also,  the  rates 
offered a more realistic noise level than many of the theoretical studies had used before. This 
questions the generalizability of noise-robustness results by studies with noise below p = 0.1 to 
implement the opposite move. A minority of the studies I reviewed considered noise above p = 
0.1 (Lomborg, 1996: p = 0.00–0.125, Wakano & Yamamura, 2001: p = 0.01–0.2,  Hruschka & 
Henrich, 2006: p = 0.0–0.2,  Anh et al., 2011: p = 0.01–0.15). Exclusively theoretical studies 
dealt with noise above p = 0.2 (Molander, 1985, Boyd, 1989, Bendor, 1993). At the noise level 
shown by the participants, 1-step memory strategies were almost non-existent in Chapter 1’s 
simulations with 1-step memory and non-contingent strategies. Cooperation had reached a low 
point  and  eventually  vanished  with  increasing  noise,  while  AllD  took  over.  If  humans,  in 
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everyday  life,  adhered  to  the  1-step  memory  and  non-contingent  strategies  as  used  in  the 
simulations,  cooperation  would  not  exist  in  the  world.  Apparently,  humans  use  different 
strategies  to  maintain  cooperation  in  the  face  of  noise.  One  possible  strategy  to  decrease 
memory requirements was the subject of Chapter 2.
The strategy of assigning partner types is ecologically rational
In Chapter 2, my collaborators and I investigated whether participants categorize partners 
into  types  and  preferentially  remember  one  type,  thereby  reducing  memory  requirements. 
Asking participants about their partners several minutes and one week after interactions with 
them, they accurately determined partner types. Thus, participants noticed the difference in their 
partners’ behaviour and assigned types accordingly. Categorization accuracy in general was very 
high  (higher  than  in  many other  studies),  but  participants  categorized  the  rare  type  in  the 
environment  more  accurately  (corrected  for  the  chance  level)  than  the  common  one. 
Presumably,  participants remembered the rare and inferred the common type.  That does not 
mean that they neglected partners of the common type, though. In this case, they would not have 
been able to distinguish partners of the inferred type from new partners in the recognition task.  
In sum, participants achieve the best with minimal effort and in the face of noise: To not get  
exploited by defectors but also not miss cooperation with cooperators, participants seemed to 
memorize their partners’ faces, assign them to types based on the demonstrated behaviour, and 
preferentially remember the rare type in the environment to infer the common one. How humans 
could categorize partners into types, my collaborator and I explored in Chapter 3.
Impression-based  strategies  are  cognitively  feasible  and  noise-robust 
alternatives to 1-step memory strategies
Chapter  3  explored  a  strategy  group  proposed  to  model  the  process  of  partner  type 
categorization.  Building an impression of one’s interaction partner  instead of relying on the 
previous move turned out to be more noise-robust in a simulation with non-contingent, 1-step 
memory,  and  impression-based  strategies.  Moreover,  impression-based  strategies  predicted 
participants’  behaviour  better  than  1-step  memory  strategies,  implying  a  better  cognitive 
feasibility  compared  to  remembering  each  partner’s  previous  move.  Most  successful  in  the 
simulation  and  best-predicting  in  terms  of  participants’  behaviour  were  non-contingent 
strategies, though. Apparently, previous research underestimated the influence of noise on the 
choice of interaction strategies in humans. Future research on cognitively feasible noise-robust 
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strategies has to think in simpler dimensions. That does not imply going back to 1-step memory 
strategies  but  to  strategies  that  probably do not  rely too much on their  partners’ individual 
strategies.  These strategies seem to stick mostly to cooperating or defecting after  the initial 
acquainting and depending on the degree of hostility in the interaction group. A strategy (almost) 
not relying on noise-susceptible information is, of course, the best recipe against noise. Before 
throwing  reciprocity  overboard,  one  has  to  consider  that  the  design  of  the  simulation  is 
improvable.  Also,  non-contingent  strategies  predicted  participants’  behaviour  better  than 
impression-based and 1-step memory strategies but in no way perfectly.  The question which 
strategies humans use under noise to maintain cooperation remains to be answered.
The overall picture
The  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  is  the  dominant  paradigm  to  explore  the  emergence  of 
cooperation. Since its first formalisation in the early 1950’s, and boosted by Axelrod’s  (1984) 
seminal work, authors have proposed ways to bring it closer to modelling the real world. Of the 
many  innovations,  I  only  mention:  n-person  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  (e.g.,  Boyd  & Richerson, 
1988),  stochasticity (e.g.,  Nowak & Sigmund,  1989,  1990,  1992),  reputation (e.g.,  Kandori, 
1992),  spatial  proximity (e.g.,  Nowak & May,  1992),  continuous  moves  (e.g.,  Frean,  1996, 
Sherratt & Roberts, 1999), indirect reciprocity/image scoring (e.g.,  Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), 
be able to opt out of an interaction (e.g.,  McNamara, Barta & Houston, 2004), composition of 
the strategy environment (e.g., Aktipis, 2006), friendships (e.g., Hruschka & Henrich, 2006), or 
a  combination  of  these  (e.g.,  continuous  cooperation  and possibility  to  opt  out:  Sherratt  & 
Roberts,  1998,  continuous  cooperation  and  reputation:  Chong  &  Yao,  2007,  continuous 
cooperation, spatial proximity, and variable memory: Alonso-Sanz, 2009). In three chapters, my 
collaborators  and  I  investigated  another  branch:  noise.  The  first  chapter  showed  that  the 
requirements of seemingly simple 1-step memory strategies push boundedly rational players to 
cognitive  limits  manifested  in  committing  errors—and  thus  cannot  be  deemed  cognitively 
feasible  and  noise-robust.  The  second  chapter  investigated  a  way  of  reducing  memory 
requirements, thereby becoming more noise-robust, by assigning types to interaction partners 
and preferentially remembering one type over the other in an ecologically rational manner. In 
the third chapter, my collaborator and I designed strategies to investigate the way a partner type 
or impression could be built which were more noise-robust than 1-step memory strategies and 
predicted participants’ behaviour better.
Besides noise as the overarching theme in my thesis,  my collaborators and I  included 
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various  other  realistic  elements.  First,  instead  of  meeting  their  interaction  partners  one 
(repeatedly)  after  the  other,  in  the  experiments  in  Chapters  1  and  2,  participants  met  their 
partners  repeatedly  but  randomly.  Second,  for  testing  partner  type  memory  in  Chapter  2, 
participants did not see predetermined labels but  experienced partners repeatedly so that they 
could categorize them on their own. Third, to find the best of a number of strategies independent 
of  the  choice  of  the  experimenter,  my  collaborator  and  I  let  it  evolve  from a  rich  set  of 
parameters using a genetic algorithm simulation in Chapter 3.
Not all of the innovations proposed for the Prisoner’s Dilemma embrace the pursuit of 
reality, however. Twenty years after Axelrod (1984), another tournament took place, aiming to 
find the best strategy for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and, again, some of the submitted 
strategies entailed complex mathematical mechanisms (e.g.,  Au & Nau, 2006). Future research 
on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma should not lose sight of its original purpose which was to 
serve as a simplified version of human interactions with strategies supposed to model human 
behaviour. Mathematically elaborate strategies might be successful in the artificial laboratory 
situation, but do they capture human behaviour? The experiment in Chapter 1 demonstrated the 
cognitive  infeasibility  of  1-step  memory  strategies  that  were  assumed  to  be  simple  rules. 
Chapter 3’s cross-validation revealed that the majority of strategies failed to predict participants’ 
behaviour. 
Testing whether strategies comply with human behaviour has been widely neglected in the 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma literature. Although some authors compared participants’ behaviour 
with strategies (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, Oskamp, 1971, Wilson, 1971, Opp, 1988), these 
were results  averaged over  all  participants.  For  reliable  predictions  about  human behaviour, 
individual analyses are better suited (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). The only individual-based 
cross-validations  I  found  were  from Wedekind  and  Milinski  (1996,  Milinski  &  Wedekind, 
1998), but the authors did not specify their cross-validation method and participants’ behaviour 
was categorized as either of two strategies based on which strategy made fewer mistakes in 
prediction.  It  would  have  been  interesting  to  see  for  how  many  participants  accuracy  of 
prediction was below chance.
Although  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  has  been  the  dominant  paradigm to  investigate  the 
emergence  of  cooperation,  it  has  a  limited  scope.  All  innovations  to  make it  more realistic 
cannot free it completely from a certain artificiality. Among others, Koenig (1988), Lazarus and 
Metcalfe  (1990), and Stephens et al.  (1995) list several cases in which a suspected Prisoner’s 
94
Dilemma  situation  in  reality  was  later  refuted.  The  latter  authors  close  by  warning  that 
“Advocates  of  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  urgently  need  to  articulate  the  empirical  basis  for 
continued interest in this research program”.
Conclusion
The  three  chapters  of  this  thesis  demonstrated  the  importance  of  noise  for  the 
implementation of decisions: First,  participants cannot use 1-step memory strategies without 
committing errors—and given these errors cooperation vanishes. Second, as a strategy to reduce 
memory requirements,  participants assign partner  types  and adapt  the type  memory to  their 
environment.  Third,  impression-based  strategies  are  more  noise-robust  and  better  predict 
participants’ behaviour than 1-step memory strategies. A strategy is best prepared against noise, 
however, if it mostly acts independently of the partner’s behaviour. Investigating strategies in 
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, my collaborators and I  used methods incorporating reality: 
among  others  repeated  but  random interactions,  a  genetic  algorithm simulation,  and  cross-
validation. I argue that future research has to regard the capabilities of a boundedly rational 
decision  maker.  For  an  even  better  fit  with  everyday  cooperative  interactions,  one  might 
consider  an  alternative  to  the  Iterated  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game.  Taking  all  of  these 
considerations into account, research will come one step closer to finding cognitively feasible 
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Document A1. Participant Instructions
Below is a translation from German of the participant instructions.
Instructions
In this experiment, you will repeatedly interact with a number of hypothetical partners. 
For each interaction, your partner will choose either to cooperate or not cooperate.  Your task is 
to recall the last action for each partner.  
To give you a concrete example of what this might mean, imagine that you repeatedly go 
out to dinner with each partner.  At the end of the meal, you each must decide individually 
whether to contribute to a tip for the waiter.  If your partner tips, this would be an instance of 
cooperating, but if your partner does not contribute to the tip, then this is not cooperating. 
In this task, we will assess how well you remember whether each partner cooperated or 
not the last time you interacted.
Procedure
First you will be shown for each partner whether he/she cooperates or not. You should try 
to remember each partner’s action. In the example below, Natalie cooperates.
After observing all of the partners’ actions one after the other, it follows the retrieval of the 
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actions of the individual partners. For this purpose you will meet each partner again but not 
necessarily in the same order as in the beginning. Each time you will be asked whether the 
displayed partner cooperated or not the last time that you interacted with him/her. 
Press ‘k’ for ‘cooperate’ or ‘n’ for ‘not cooperate’. You will have ten seconds to respond. If 
you wait longer than ten seconds, the question will be skipped. 
After each response, you will learn whether you were correct. Thereafter you will see what 
the partner decides to do this time. In the example below, Natalie doesn’t cooperate this time.
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This is now the action that you should try to keep in mind. The task always is to recall 
the last action for the partner. Then there will follow the retrieval, feedback, and new action 
for the next partner and so on.
Please respond as accurately as possible. You will receive 5 Cents for every correct 
response (in addition to your show-up fee of 5 Euro). Altogether you can receive an additional 
payment of 8 Euro on average. For incorrect responses or skipped questions, you will receive no 
payment.
Generally
For this experiment your partners will be grouped, such that you will repeatedly interact 
with the same partners before moving on to a new group of partners. Each group will have a 
different number of partners which you will interact with a different number of times. After you 
complete a group, you can have a short break before beginning the next group. The whole task 
should last about 1,5 hours.
You will begin with a practice phase in which you can see how the task works without 
earning money. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter. If you are ready to begin 
the practice phase, please press <space bar> on the computer keyboard.
Document A2. Participant Questionnaire
Below is a translation from German of the participant questionnaire.
1. Do you know one/some of the depicted persons?
2. Did you associate memories of a/some certain person/s with one/some of the used names?
3. Of 10 decisions that you made how often did you guess on average?
4. Of 10 of your partner’s actions how often, you think, did the interaction partners cooperate on 
average? 
5. Did you pursue a certain strategy for memorizing the partner’s actions? If you did, please 
describe the strategy you used.
6. What did you do when you couldn’t remember the action from the previous round?




Document B1. Instructions for the first session
This  experiment  is  about  social  interactions.  You  will  repeatedly  interact  with  other 
people.  Depending on what your interaction partner and you decide to do, you will  receive 
points.  These points will be converted into money which you will be paid in the end. Your 
interaction partners are not actually people, but they pursue strategies that have been identified 
in humans in experimental contexts before. 
The interaction
The interaction is  about agreeing with the opponent without being able to talk to one 
another. Imagine, for example, you produced some work in collaboration with a colleague. Your 
boss is not satisfied with the quality and calls the two of you individually into his office to  
search for reasons and maybe find the one to blame. Further, imagine your colleague and you 
just  have  the  choice  between  “cooperating”  or  “refusing  to  cooperate”  with  the  other. 
“Cooperating” in this case means to remain silent; “refusing” is to blame the other one. Even if 
your colleague was at your boss’ office first, you do not have a chance getting to know what he 
decided to do before you go in there yourself—you do not have the opportunity to talk to one 
another. Depending on what your colleague and you decide to do, there arise 4 possibilities: 
1. You refuse to cooperate with your colleague and blame him, whereas he aims to cooperate and 
remains silent. Thereby, you are looking pretty good in the eyes of your boss; your colleague 
attracts the whole resentment.
2. Your colleague and you refuse to cooperate with each other and blame one another. The boss 
will think that none of you is completely innocent when it comes to the quality of the work  
and call both of you to account. 
3. Your colleague and you cooperate and remain silent what concerns the one to blame. Your 
boss will be insecure and teach both of you at least a little lesson.
4. You protect your colleague and remain silent, whereas he blames you. You will have to carry 
the whole damage yourself, whereas your colleague gets away without a penalty.
In the experiment, these different results are translated into points you earn, depending on 
what your partner and you decide to do. You see the distribution of points in Table 1.
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Table 1
Payoff in points for all interaction situations.
You Interaction Partner
Cooperate Refuse 
Cooperate 3 ; 3 0 ; 5
Refuse 5 ; 0 1 ; 1
Please have a close look at the payoff matrix: You cannot just see the points you will 
receive for all of the four situations (left value in each cell) but also those that your partner will 
get  (right  value  in  each  cell).  If  you  decide,  for  example,  to  “refuse”,  the  other  person to 
“cooperate”, the lower left cell comes into effect: You receive 5 points, your interaction partner 
0. If both of you “refuse”, each one of you earns 1 point (lower right cell). If the two of you opt  
for “cooperate”, each of you will  get 3 points (upper left).  If you choose “cooperate”, your 
partner “refuse”, you will get 0 points, your partner 5 (upper right).
The procedure
First, the partner will be introduced to you with image and name (Please note that the 
people  on  the  images  were  asked  to  look  neutrally.  Jewellery  and  possible  make-up  were 
removed. They all wear the same t-shirt.). In the example below, your partner is Bernd.
After that, you will be asked to choose one of two alternatives. To do so, please press the 
key “q” for “cooperate” or “p” for “refuse”. You will have ten seconds to react. If you wait 
longer than ten seconds, the question will be skipped.
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Assume you chose “cooperate”. Imagine your interaction partner (here: Bernd) got the 
question what to do with you at the same time. On the next screen (and in the example below) 
you will experience what the interaction partner decided to do.
Next, you will be shown with the help of the payoff matrix how many points you and your 
partner receive. In this case, you will get 0 points, Bernd 5.
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Therewith,  the  interaction  with  Bernd  is  over.  What  follows  is  introduction,  decision 
question, partner decision, and payoff information for the next partner and so on. After you have 
interacted with each person, you will meet all of them again repeatedly and in random order.
A certain percent of the overall number of points you will be paid in the end (additionally 
to the 5 Euro show-up fee). All in all, you may earn approximately 4–16 Euro additionally. You 
will not earn money for skipped questions.
The overview
The experiment begins with a phase which will test whether you understood the payoff 
matrix. You will only continue when you answered more than 80% of the questions correctly. 
After that, there follows a practice phase in which you will get to know the interaction situation 
without earning money. Then, the actual interactions will take place. Thereupon, two tasks are 
attached for which instructions will be given on the screen. The whole session should take about 
80 min.
As  the  experimenter  already  told  you,  this  experiment  requires  an  additional  session 
(approximately 40 minutes) in a week. You absolutely have to participate in this; the date cannot 
be postponed. Details concerning the procedure and the tasks will be given to you then.
Should you have any questions, please ask the experimenter. If you are ready to begin with 
the first phase, please press the space bar on the keyboard.
Have fun with the experiment and thanks for your collaboration!
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Document B2. Questionnaire
1. Did you pursue a certain strategy in interacting with the partners? If yes, please describe the 
strategy you used.
2. In case you memorized cooperators/refusers in particular: Why did you choose the one or the 
other group?
3. How did you come to a decision when you could not remember your partner’s action from the 
last interaction?
4. How much were you involved emotionally in the experiment?
5. Were you angry about something? If yes, what was it?
6. How angry were you on a scale from 0 (not at all) until 100 (very much)?
7. Were you happy about something? If yes, what was it?
8. How happy were you on a scale from 0 (not at all) until 100 (very much)?
9. Do you know one/some of the depicted persons? If yes, which one/ones?
10. Did you associate the memory of a specific person/specific persons with one/some of the 
names? If yes, with which name/names?
11. Did you notice differences between the pictures (colour of the background/shirt, light, 
quality)? If yes, which pictures differed?
12. How interesting did you find the whole study (Session 1 and 2) on a scale from 0 (not at all) 
until 100 (very much)?
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13. If you have comments or suggestions concerning the experiment, please note them.
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Document B3. Categorization using Barclay’s method
To compare our findings to Barclay’s (2008), we applied his analytical method to our data. 
For accuracy rates, he considered the correct categorizations of the 20 old partners, independent 
of correct recognition (Figure B1a). For chance level, he proposed the perceived proportion of 
partner types among old and new partners. To correct the accuracy rates for the chance levels, 
Barclay used a relative difference [(accuracy rate - chance level) / chance level] and averaged 
across  participants.  We  excluded  data  from  3  participants  due  to  division  by  0.  Applying 
Barclay’s  method  to  our  data,  we  found  that,  in  the  defectors-rare  and  equal-proportion 
condition, defectors were categorized more accurately than cooperators; in the cooperators-rare 
condition,  cooperators were categorized more accurately than defectors (Figure B1b).  When 
looking at  individual participants, the majority of them showed the pattern in the respective 
condition: 97% of participants in the defectors-rare and 77% in the equal-proportion condition 
categorized  defectors  better  than  they  categorized  cooperators,  66% in  the  cooperators-rare 
condition categorized cooperators better than they categorized defectors.
We observed  a  similar  pattern  of  results  in  the  second session  (Figures  B1c,  d).  The 
individual data analysis showed that this held for most of the participants: 83% in the defectors-
rare condition and 61% in the equal condition categorized defectors better than they categorized 
cooperators,  66% in  the  cooperators-rare  condition  categorized  cooperators  better  than  they 
categorized defectors.
In both sessions, the results, given the chance levels of perceived proportion of partner 
types  among  old  and new partners,  support  the  predictions  of  the  rarity  hypothesis  in  that 
participants better remember the partner type that is rare in the interaction group.
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Figure B1. Accuracy rates using Barclay’s method. Part (a) depicts the categorization accuracy 
for old partners independent of correct recognition (± 95% confidence interval)  in the three 
conditions in the first session. The solid line represents the chance levels based on the perceived 
proportion of partner types among old and new partners. In part (b), we present the relative 
differences between accuracy rates and chance levels using [(accuracy rate - chance level) / 
chance level] averaged across participants. The lower parts (c and d) show the respective results 
from the second session after 1 week. In the cooperators-rare condition, we averaged across n = 
30 for defectors and n = 29 for cooperators in each session.
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Table B1
Accuracy rates for recognition, categorization independent of correct recognition, and 
categorization in conjunction with correct recognition (with 95% confidence intervals) from 
different studies investigating partner-type memory.

















Defectors 97.4 ± 3.1 88.2 ± 7.8 86.2 ± 8.8
Cooperators 99.0 ± 0.7 70.3 ± 9.8 69.7 ± 9.9
Equal 
Proportion
Defectors 99.7 ± 0.6 90.3 ± 5.6 90.0 ± 5.5
Cooperators 100.0 72.2 ± 8.9 72.2 ± 8.9
Cooperators 
Rare
Defectors 98.8 ± 1.2 91.5 ± 5.6 90.9 ± 5.7








Defectors 81.9 ± 7.4 38.7 ± 9.0 32.5 ± 8.8
Cooperators 73.9 ± 5.7 80.9 ± 5.2 62.0 ± 6.9
Equal 
Proportion
Defectors 70.3 ± 10.5 58.5 ± 9.0 44.3 ± 10.2
Cooperators 75.7 ± 8.0 63.0 ± 7.6 51.8 ± 8.8
Cooperators 
Rare
Defectors 75.8 ± 7.3 85.3 ± 4.1 64.8 ± 6.2
Cooperators 85.0 ± 4.9 40.0 ± 12.9 35.6 ± 12.1




Defectors 73.1 ± 0.4* – 42.5 ± 0.5*






Defectors 47.5–57.5 ± 
0.2*‡
– 22.5–35.0 ± 
0.2*‡
Cooperators 42.5–47.5 ± – 25.0–27.5 ± 
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0.2*‡ 0.2*‡






Defectors 98.7 ± 1.8 75.7 ± 8.8 75.0 ± 9.1
Cooperators 98.4 ± 1.0 72.5 ± 9.4 71.5 ± 9.2
Equal 
Proportion
Defectors 99.0 ± 1.1 70.0 ± 10.1 69.0 ± 10.1
Cooperators 99.0 ± 1.1 68.7 ± 8.1 68.1 ± 8.1
Cooperators 
Rare
Defectors 95.4 ± 3.0 85.0 ± 8.4 82.5 ± 8.7
Cooperators 99.2 ± 1.6 64.2 ± 9.9 63.3 ± 9.9




Defectors 43.3–77.5‡ – –
Cooperators 40.0–46.7‡ – –
Oda (1997) Equal 
Proportion
Defectors 46.7–50.0 ± 
0.4–0.5*‡
– –
Cooperators 34.4–51.1 ± 
0.4–0.5*‡
– –
Note. We only report partner-memory studies that provided raw values in the paper. * We 
calculated the 95% confidence interval from the standard deviations given. †  SIM = Source 
Identification Measure. ‡ The values give the range of results for studies distinguishing several 






Strategies or strategy families in which we categorized the chromosome.
Strategy Description and chromosome implementation
1-step memory strategies
Apologizer defect on the first move, 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate
0, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| ≥ dc), (|cc| ≥ dd),
0, < 0, > 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 1, *,




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind), 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with 
probability ind)
*, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| ≥ dc), (|cc| ≥ dd), 
*, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 1, *,
*, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 2, *, with (|cc| ≥ cd), (|cc| ≥ dc), (|cc| ≥ 
dd)
Cooperator defect on the first move, 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner defected, defect
0, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| ≥ dc), (|cd| ≥ dd), 
0, > 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 1, *,




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind), 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner defected, defect
*, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| ≥ dc), (|cd| ≥ dd),
*, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 1, *,
*, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 2, *, with (|cd| ≥ cc), (|cd| ≥ dc), (|cd| ≥ 
dd)
Temptation defect on the first move, 
if defected and partner cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner defected, cooperate from then on,
0, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (dd > |dc|), 
0, > 0, > 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 1, *,




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind), 
if defected and partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated, cooperate (at cc/cd = 0 with probability ind),
if defected and partner defected, cooperate from then on
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (dd > |dc|), 
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 1, *,
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, [1, 2, 0] / [1, > 1, 1], with (dd > |dc|)
Shy defect on the first move,
if defected and partner defected, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate from then on
0, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (dc > |dd|), 
0, > 0, > 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *,
0, > 0, > 0, > 0, ≤ 0, [1, 2, 0] / [1, > 1, 1], with (dc > |dd|)
probShy 
(probabilistic Shy)
defect on the first move with probability (100-ind),
if defected and partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated, cooperate (at cc/cd = 0 with probability ind),
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate from then on
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (dc > |dd|), 
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, [1, 2, 0] / [1, > 1, 1], with (dc > |dd|)
AntiTFT 
(Anti-Tit-For-Tat)
defect on the first move,
if partner cooperated, defect,
if partner defected, cooperate
0, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, * , 1, with (|cc| = dd), (dd > |dc|)
0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 1, *





defect on the first move with probability (100-ind),
if partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with probability (100-
ind)),
if partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with probability ind)
*, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| = dd), (dd > |dc|), 
*, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 1, *




defect on the first move,
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate, 
if defected and partner defected, defect,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate
0, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| ≥ dc), (dc > |dd|), 
0, < 0, > 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *, 
0, < 0, > 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 2, *, with (|cc| ≥ dc), (|cc| ≥ cd), (dc > |
dd|)
probWCLS (probabilistic defect on the first move with probability (100-ind),
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Win-Change, Lose-Stay) if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate, 
if defected and partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with 
probability ind)
*, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| ≥ dc), (dc > |dd|), 
*, < 0, ≥ 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *, 




cooperate on the first move,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner defected, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, defect
if defected and partner defected, cooperate
100, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| > cc), (|cd| = dd), 
100, ≥ 0, < 0, < 0, > 0, 1, 1, *, 




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner defected, defect
if defected and partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if defected and partner defected, cooperate
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| > cc), (|cd| = dd), 
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 1, *, 
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 2, *, with (|cd| > cc), (dd ≥ |cd|), (dd ≥ |
dc|)
TFT (Tit-For-Tat) cooperate on the first move,
if partner cooperated, cooperate,
if partner defected, defect
100, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| > cc), (|cd| = dc), 
100, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, < 0, 1, 1, *, 




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with probability ind),
if partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with probability (100-ind))
*, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| > cc), (|cd| = dc), 
*, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *, 
*, ≥ 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 2, *, with (|cd| > cc), (dc ≥ |cd|), (dc ≥ |
dd|)
Lurer cooperate on the first move,
if cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner defected, cooperate
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100, < 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (dd ≥ |cc|), (dd ≥ |cd|), 
100, < 0, < 0, < 0, > 0, 1, 1, *, 




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if defected and partner defected, cooperate
*, < 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 0, *, 1, with (dd ≥ |cc|), (dd ≥ |cd|), 
*, < 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, 1, 1, *, 




cooperate on the first move,
if cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if defected and partner defected, defect
100, < 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (dc ≥ |cc|), (dc ≥ |cd|), 
100, < 0, < 0, > 0, < 0, 1, 1, *, 





cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if defected and partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with 
probability (100-ind))
*, < 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (dc ≥ |cc|), (dc ≥ |cd|), 
*, < 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *, 
*, < 0, < 0, > 0, ≤ 0, 1, 2, *, with (dc ≥ |cc|), (dc ≥ |cd|), (dc ≥ |
dd|)
Sucker cooperate on the first move,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect from then on
100, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| > cd), 
100, < 0, ≥ 0, < 0, < 0, 1, 1, *
100, < 0, ≥ 0, < 0, < 0, [1, 2, 0] / [1, > 1, 1], with (|cc| > cd)
probSucker (probabilistic 
Sucker)
cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if defected, defect (at dc/dd = 0 with probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect from then on
*, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cc| > cd), 
*, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *
*, < 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, [1, 2, 0] / [1, > 1, 1], with (|cc| > cd)
Grim (Grim Trigger) cooperate on the first move,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner defected, defect from then on
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100, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| > cc), 
100, ≥ 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, 1, 1, *
100, ≥ 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, [1, 2, 0] / [1,> 1, 1],with (|cd| > cc)
probGrim (probabilistic 
Grim)
cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if defected, defect (at dc/dd = 0 with probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner defected, defect from then on
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, 0, *, 1, with (|cd| > cc), 
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, 1, 1, *





defect on the first move with probability (100-ind), 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with 
probability ind)




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind), 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner defected, defect




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind), 
if defected and partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if defected and partner defected, cooperate,
if cooperated, cooperate (at cc/cd = 0 with probability ind)




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind),
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if defected and partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated, cooperate (at cc/cd = 0 with probability ind)




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind),
if partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with probability (100-
ind)),
if partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with probability ind)




defect on the first move with probability (100-ind),
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate, 
if defected and partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect,
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with 
132
probability ind)




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner defected, defect
if defected and partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if defected and partner defected, cooperate
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, > 0, [0, *, *] / [1, > 1, *]
iTFT (Adding, ConAdding, 
Averaging, ConAveraging)
cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with probability ind),
if partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with probability (100-ind))




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, defect (at dc = 0 with 
probability (100-ind)),
if defected and partner defected, cooperate




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated, defect,
if defected and partner cooperated, cooperate,
if defected and partner defected, defect (at dd = 0 with 
probability (100-ind))




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, defect, 
if cooperated and partner defected, cooperate (at cd = 0 with 
probability ind),
if defected, defect (at dc/dd = 0 with probability (100-ind))




cooperate on the first move with probability ind,
if cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate (at cc = 0 with 
probability ind),
if cooperated and partner defected, defect,
if defected, defect (at dc/dd = 0 with probability (100-ind))
*, ≥ 0, < 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, [0, *, *] / [1, > 1, *]
Non-contingent strategies
AllD (all defect) always defect
[0, *, *, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, *, *, *]†,
0, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
C_1–25 cooperate on every move with 1–25%
[0 < ind ≤ 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, *, *, *]†,
0 < ind ≤ 25, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
C_26–49 cooperate on every move with 26–49%
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[25 < ind ≤ 49, 0, 0, 0, 0, *, *, *]†,
25 < ind ≤ 49, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
Random determine randomly whether to cooperate or defect
[50, 0, 0, 0, 0, *, *, *]†,
50, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
C_51–74 cooperate on every move with 51–74%
[50 < ind ≤ 74, 0, 0, 0, 0, *, *, *]†,
50 < ind ≤ 74, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
C_75–99 cooperate on every move with 75–99%
[74 < ind ≤ 99, 0, 0, 0, 0, *, *, *]†,
74 < ind ≤ 99, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
AllC (all cooperate) always cooperate
[100, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, *, *, *, *, *]†,
100, *, *, *, *, 1, 0, *
D_1st_1–25C cooperate on the first move with 1–25%,
defect from then on
[0 < ind ≤ 25, < 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, *, *, *]†
D_1st_26–50C cooperate on the first move with 26–50%,
defect from then on
[25 < ind ≤ 50, < 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, *, *, *]†
D_1st_51–75C cooperate on the first move with 51–75%,
defect from then on
[50 < ind ≤ 75, < 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, *, *, *]†
D_1st_76–100C cooperate on the first move with 76–100%,
defect from then on
[75 < ind ≤ 100, < 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, *, *, *]†
C_1st_0–24C cooperate on the first move with 0–24%,
cooperate from then on
[0 ≤ ind < 25, > 0, > 0, > 0, > 0, *, *, *]†
C_1st_25–49C cooperate on the first move with 25–49%,
cooperate from then on
[25 ≤ ind < 50, > 0, > 0, > 0, > 0, *, *, *]†
C_1st_50–74C cooperate on the first move with 50–74%,
cooperate from then on
[50 ≤ ind < 75, > 0, > 0, > 0, > 0, *, *, *]†
C_1st_75–99C cooperate on the first move with 75–99%,
cooperate from then on
[75 ≤ ind < 100, > 0, > 0, > 0, > 0, *, *, *]†
probCoop (probabilistically 
cooperating strategy)
cooperate on every move (at cc/cd = 0 with probability ind)
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, > 0, > 0, *, *, *
ExtremeAlternate defect or cooperate on the first move, 
if defected, cooperate,
if cooperated, defect
[0|100, < 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, 1, 1, *]†, 
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[0|100, < 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, [0, *, *] / [1, 2, *], with (cc = cd), (dc = 




cooperate on the first move with probability ind, 
if cooperated, defect, 
if defected, cooperate
*, < 0, < 0, > 0, > 0, *, *, *
probMoody 
(probabilistic Moody)
cooperate on the first move with probability ind, 
if cooperated, cooperate (at cc/cd with probability ind), 
if defected, defect (at dc/dd = 0 with probability (100-ind))
*, ≥ 0, ≥ 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, *, *, *
probDef (probabilistically 
defecting strategy)
defect on every move (at dc/dd = 0 with probability (100-ind))
*, < 0, < 0, ≤ 0, ≤ 0, *, *, *
Note. The chromosome implementation gives the parameters for the genes ind (probability to 
cooperate on the first move and when indifferent, i.e., impression index = 0), cc (weight for CC 
on the previous move), cd (weight for CD), dc (weight for DC), dd (weight for DD), ada (0 = 
adding, 1 = averaging), ws (window size), and rec (0 = regular form, 1 = contradictory form). 
For  impression-based  and  probabilistic  non-contingent  strategies,  the  description  is  only 
approximate,  as  the  way  the  gene  parameters  are  implemented  into  an  impression  index 
(Adding, ConAdding, Averaging, ConAveraging) determines the actual behaviour. With 1-step 
memory strategies, chromosome categorizations of strict and probabilistic form often overlap 
(e.g., Apologizer corresponds to one of the probApologizer categorizations with ind = 0), so we 
implemented  the  strategies  in  the  given  order  (from specific  to  general)  to  make  sure  all 
strategies are categorized properly. * The parameters for the respective genes are irrelevant.  † 
The chromosome implementation is omitted with the onset of noise.
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Figure C1
Figure  C1.  Proportion  of  1-step  memory  strategies  winning  among  10,000  runs  over  an 
increasing level of noise (represented by the standard deviation of a normal distribution around 
the correct impression index/weight).
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Figure C2
Figure  C2.  Proportion  of  impression-based  strategies  winning  among  10,000  runs  over  an 
increasing level of noise (represented by the standard deviation of a normal distribution around 
the correct impression index/weight).
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Figure C3
Figure  C3. Proportion  of  non-contingent  strategies  winning  among  10,000  runs  over  an 
increasing level of noise (represented by the standard deviation of a normal distribution around 
the correct impression index/weight).
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